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The United States Supreme Court's decision in 19771 that a private
antitrust plaintiff bringing an action for damages must prove antitrust
injury has energized the antitrust bar, and the federal courts, to invent
notions of antitrust standing. In later cases, the Court has attempted to
shape a policy of antitrust standing which properly integrates a concept
of antitrust injury and guides access to the federal courts.2 Instead, the
Court has created a vague balancing test for determining standing to sue
in private antitrust actions and an indeterminate standard for deciding
whether a plaintiff has alleged antitrust injury. The Court's doctrinal
standards for determining which parties gain access to the federal courts
to assert antitrust claims has created great uncertainty in the lower
federal courts and the antitrust bar. This uncertainty has been caused
by the Court's failure to define the relationship of the antitrust injury
requirement to the broader doctrine of antitrust standing in private an-
titrust actions, the vague descriptions of those doctrines, and the use of
those threshold inquiries to decide cases on the merits.
Inventive and controversial efforts to shape an antitrust standing doc-
trine have been made by lower courts in cases involving private actions
for maximum resale price maintenance. These cases typically involve
claims by terminated distributors that a manufacturer or supplier con-
spired with another distributor to fix maximum resale prices and that
the termination was a consequence of the plaintiff's refusal to adhere to
the fixed resale prices. 3 Antitrust defendants have successfully argued
that a terminated distributor or other competitor, while having suffered
damages as a result of termination or lost sales, has not suffered "antitrust
injury."4
The circuit courts of appeal are split on the issue of antitrust injury in
maximum resale price maintenance cases.5 The courts denying standing
to terminated distributors and competitors have reasoned that they have
suffered no antitrust injury because consumers of the price fixed products
are being made better off by the price fixing scheme. 6 This view of an-
titrust standing has been advanced by academic commentary that the
I Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
2 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue
Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
3 See, e.g., Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
4See, e.g., Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th
Cir.), reh'g denied (1989).
Compare USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. granted, - U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 2446 (1989) with Tennessean
Truckstop, Inc. v. NTS, Inc, 875 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1989); Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d
1409 (1989); Jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d 698.6 See, e.g., Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1419-20.
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advancement of economic efficiency is the only purpose for the antitrust
laws.7 A contrasting view identifies broader objectives to the antitrust
laws and concludes that, since vertical price fixing conspiracies are pres-
umptively illegal, antitrust standing should be granted to competitors
harmed by the practice. 8
The cases involving claims for maximum resale price maintenance
illustrate dramatically the deficiencies of the antitrust standing and an-
titrust injury doctrines articulated by the Supreme Court. The Court's
treatment of those fundamental threshold doctrines is not anchored to
either congressional intent favoring private rights of action or any dis-
cernable policy for private antitrust actions. The Court's failure to apply,
in a principled and predictable manner, a policy-based doctrine of anti-
trust standing raises fundamental issues of proper institutional powers.
This Article examines the textual and prudential foundations of the
antitrust standing and antitrust injury doctrines. This examination is
conducted through a textual analysis of section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which provides a private right of action for persons injured by violations
of the antitrust laws, and a developmental review of the principal Su-
preme Court cases articulating and applying those doctrines. This ex-
amination concludes that the Court has crafted antitrust standing and
injury doctrines which in part either contradict the textual requirements
of section 4 or which are not rooted in any perceptible notion of legitimate
statutory objectives. The Article also demonstrates a core of statutory
principles and judicial interpretation which can form a principled and
threshold analysis of antitrust standing.
The Article proposes an approach of antitrust standing which recog-
nizes the proper accommodation between congressional power to create
private rights of action and legitimate judicial power limiting access to
the courts for reasons which permit the accomplishment of congressional
objectives and protect judicial resources. This approach to antitrust stand-
ing, which draws upon established analysis of statutory standing in ad-
ministrative law proceedings, is then applied to private claims for
damages from maximum resale price maintenance.
I. A DOCTRINAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST INJURY
AND ANTITRUST STANDING REQUIREMENTS
This section conducts a review of the development of the standing doc-
trine and antitrust injury requirement in antitrust cases. This review
7 See, e.g., Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1445, 1450-51 (1985) [hereinafter Page, Antitrust Liability]; Page, Antitrust
Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Ci.
L. REV. 467 (1980) [hereinafter Page, Antitrust Damages].
See, e.g., USA Petroleum, 859 F.2d 687.
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considers the textual requirements of section 4 and the Supreme Court's
efforts to craft an antitrust standing policy. The review concludes that
neither the standing doctrine nor the antitrust injury requirement have
been clearly formulated because the Court has failed to precisely link
them with the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws. Instead, the Court
has created a vague and seemingly shifting set of standards for deter-
mining antitrust standing and has used the antitrust injury doctrine to
address substantive antitrust issues on the merits.
A. Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases
In recent years the Supreme Court has decided several cases concerning
the right of a private party to maintain an antitrust action? These law-
suits were brought pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act, which pro-
vides a private right of action for damages to "any person ... injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws . . . ." In those cases the Court has established the elements of a
private cause of action under section 4, and, in particular, has articulated
a doctrine of antitrust standing.
Under the antitrust standing doctrine a threshold examination of the
relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury is
used to determine who gains access to the federal courts. In this funda-
mental respect antitrust standing is like standing to sue in other con-
texts." The process of fashioning a standing analysis is seldom easy, and
the ingredients of a standing analysis are generally not precisely drawn.12
It is, however, possible to define the basic contours of the jurisprudential
and functional purposes served by a standing to sue doctrine, whether or
not it specifically addresses antitrust claims.
First, a standing to sue analysis performs a threshold examination of
the parties, their claims, and the substantive underpinnings of the plain-
9 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); As-
sociated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519
(1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
10 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee
See Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1434, 1466 (1988); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68,
88-92 (1984).
12 In the context of article III standing, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that
"[w]e need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III standing'
has not been defined with complete consistency ...." Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 475 (1982).
[Vol. 37:2
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tiffs claims. 13 Second, the standing to sue doctrine has two essential
ingredients: the textual requirements of positive law (for example, a stat-
utory or constitutional provision) which permit an injury to be redressed
in the federal courts, and non-textual or prudential considerations which
are shaped by courts to advance legitimate institutional concerns. 14 In
significant part, the standing to sue doctrine articulates an institutional
accommodation between the judicial and the legislative branches in which
the latter creates rights of action and the former facilitates the proper
dispatch of those rights. 5
The next two parts of this Article explicate the textual requirements
of section 4 and set forth the Court's treatment of both textual require-
ments and prudential considerations. The textual requirements derive
from the language of the statute; the non-textual or prudential consid-
erations, however, are judicially created rules which manifest either ju-
dicial interpretation of statutory requirements or fundamental judicial
concerns about administering legislative intent.16
A concluding summary demonstrates the confused nature of the current
antitrust standing doctrine and how the antitrust injury doctrine has lost
its procedural significance and become an ambiguous rule of substantive
law.
1. A Textual Analysis of Antitrust Standing
There are several statutory or textual requirements in private actions
brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act. First, a "person" entitled to
maintain an action for an antitrust violation must be a member of a
rather broad classification of individual and commercial entities, such as
partnerships, corporations, and persons, that are entitled to maintain a
"3 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 107-111 (2d ed. 1988). In
the context of antitrust standing, see Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at
1447 (describing the requirements of section 4 of the Clayton Act as "tools by
which courts identify which victims of an antitrust violation may recover dam-
ages, given the nature of the relationship between the victim's harm and the
violation.").
14 Nichol, supra note 11, at 71-72; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1470.
1" See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1459-60; Nichol, supra note 11, at 88-101.
In constitutionally based actions, the nature of the separation of powers issues
is more complex than in actions involving claims under congressional enactments.
See Nichol, supra note 11, at 90-93. However, the institutional capability issues
are fundamentally the same; i.e., the courts must determine if Congress intended
to grant access to the federal courts to that type or class of plaintiff. Id. at 91.
16 Prudential concerns about antitrust standing are similar to prudential con-
siderations in other forms of standing. They are extra-textual pronouncements
by courts which may serve to advance judicial economy and properly limit the
exercise of judicial decision-making in inappropriate cases. These considerations
can also be applied in improper ways, for example, by providing a rationale for
a court's pretextual decision on the merits. Nichol, supra note 11, at 71-73.
1989]
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private action.' 7 Second, a private party seeking damages must be injured
in his "business or property." The Court has given a broad reading to this
requirement of a recognizable economic injury, holding that a consumer
of price fixed goods has suffered injury to her "property."' 8
Third, the plaintiff must show that he was injured "by reason of' an
antitrust violation. The Court has construed the "by reason of' language
as requiring that the antitrust plaintiff show that the defendant's conduct
"caused" or was a material or substantial factor in his injury.19 This
causation requirement has been held to reflect a congressional concern
that there be a sufficient factual nexus between the alleged injury and
the defendant's anticompetitive conduct.20 It also reflects the requirement,
applied from the law of torts, that a plaintiff may recover only for injuries
which are proximately related to the violation, being neither too remote
nor merely incidental. 21 Finally, section 4 also requires that an antitrust
private plaintiff prove that she suffered antitrust injury; that is, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that she was injured because of "anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws."
22
These textual requirements of private causes of action are at the core
of the antitrust standing doctrine and the broadly drafted language re-
flects a congressional design to accomplish substantive objectives. 23 The
17 See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
"Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1979).
The Court found that the language of section 4, particularly the word "prop-
erty," should be given "a naturally broad and inclusive meaning." Id. at 338. The
Court in Reiter cited to its decision in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434
U.S. 308 (1978), for the proposition that section 4 contains very little restrictive
language. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 337. In the Pfizer case, the Court stated that:
The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden by whomever they may be
perpetrated.... And the legislative history of the Sherman Act dem-
onstrates that Congress used the phrase 'any person' intending it to
have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning.
Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312.
1" Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
2" See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
21 H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANITRUST LAW § 14.3, at 361-64
(1985).
22 The origin of the antitrust injury requirement in private lawsuits appears
to follow from the statutory language in section 4 that a plaintiff must prove that
she was injured by "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... " 15 U.S.C. §
15. Although the Supreme Court examined the congressional purpose of private
actions under section 4, it has failed to identify the precise origin of the antitrust
injury rule created in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977). See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
21 As used in this article, "antitrust standing" refers to the process of applying
the elements or requirements of section 4 to a concrete factual situation to de-
termine whether the plaintiff is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. This process requires judicial consideration of each element of the plain-
tiff s cause of action for damages. This approach must be distinguished from
another which views antitrust standing as representing only the causation ele-
ment under section 4 claims for damages. See Page, Antitrust Liability, supra
note 7, at 1446-47.
[Vol. 37:2
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textual content of the antitrust standing doctrine is rooted in congres-
sional desires to compensate injured victims and deter future antitrust
violations. 24 The legislative histories of section 4 and its predecessor pro-
vision, section 7 of the Sherman Act, demonstrate that Congress intended
to provide a remedial provision which encouraged private actions to re-
coup losses and prevent future anticompetitive behavior.25
It is also clear, however, that standing in antitrust cases is substantially
more complex than suggested by the text of section 4. The Supreme Court
has added to the textual requirements, through interpretation of textual
requirements and the creation of extra-textual considerations, factors
which affect the ability of parties to maintain private actions for alleged
antitrust violations. The next section describes the process in which the
standing doctrine and antitrust injury requirement have been created
from the text of section 4. The section also details the Court's creation of
non-textual considerations in private antitrust damage actions.
2. Judicial Development of the Antitrust Injury Requirement
and the Antitrust Standing Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court in several important cases has ar-
ticulated a number of factors which must be analyzed to determine if the
plaintiff has adequately set forth a claim for damages under section 4.
Those cases show that the Court has failed to articulate a coherent doc-
trine of antitrust standing for private antitrust actions. The Court has
failed to focus on the central themes evident in the text of section 4 and
has engrafted considerations into the law of standing. Some of these
non-textual considerations are contradictory to the congressional pur-
poses for creating private rights of action for the recovery of damages.
Other judicially created considerations further the objectives of section
4 and address judicial concerns about the use of private attorneys general
vindicating substantive antitrust law.
There are two principal components of the antitrust standing doctrine:
the causation or nexus requirement and the antitrust injury requirement.
Textually, these requirements arise from the congressional requirement
that the plaintiff show he has been injured "by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws." Although the Court has decided issues of
interpretation of other textual requirements of section 4,26 the Court has
24 See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (construing the term
"property" to include overcharges paid by consumers); Pfizer Inc. v. Government
of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (concluding that the term "person" included foreign
governments injured by domestic price fixing schemes); Hawaii v. Standard OilCo., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (finding that a state could not assert a claim for damages
in its parens patriae capacity).
1989]
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emphasized the development of the standing requirement in a series of
cases involving the causation and antitrust injury requirements.2 7
a. Development of the Antitrust Injury Doctrine
The Court fashioned the antitrust injury doctrine in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.28. A bowling center operator brought a private
antitrust action claiming that the defendant, a large manufacturer of
bowling equipment and operator of bowling alleys, violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act. According to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant had
acquired and operated several bowling alleys which competed with plain-
tiff and the plaintiff suffered injury because the defendant's large size
permitted it to operate alleys which would otherwise have failed. The
plaintiff claimed that it was injured by the reduction in profits experienced
because the defendant acquired and operated the alleys; that is, plaintiff
measured its damages by "the additional income they would have realized
had the acquired centers been closed.
'29
The Court first held that the process of "intermeshing" a substantive
statutory prohibition with a remedial provision is not always easy.30 The
Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff need prove only that it
was worse off after the acquisition than it would have been without the
acquisition. 31 Instead, the Court stressed the substantive policy of section
7, which prohibits mergers "only when they may produce anticompetitive
effects. 13 2 The Court went on to debunk plaintiff's theory of recovery by
holding that the plaintiff would have suffered the same kind of injury if
a small firm had acquired the failing alleys. Moreover, the Court criticized
the plaintiff's attempt to measure damages by the amount of profits they
would have realized if competition had been reduced. The Court held that:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the vio-
lation. It should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed
violations ... would be likely to cause. 2 3
27 Prior to 1977, the Supreme Court did not decide any cases involving either
the causation, or "by reason of', language or the antitrust injury requirement.
Since 1977, however, the Court has issued at least five cases which directly or
indirectly involve the causation or antitrust injury requirements. See supra note9.
28 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
2Id. at 481.
- Id. at 486.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 487.
33429 U.S. 477.
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The Brunswick Court did not require that an antitrust plaintiff must
prove an actual lessening of competition as a condition of maintaining a
section 4 claim.34 Rather, plaintiffs may prove injury by pointing to losses
incurred as a result of anticompetitive conduct which itself violates sub-
stantive antitrust law.35
A narrow reading of the Court's decision in Brunswick suggests that
the decision was obviously correct; a person should not be allowed to
recover damages measured in a way (i.e. by the amount of lost monopoly
profits) that stands the policy of antitrust law on its head. The Brunswick
decision, however, has other interpretations which have complex and
disturbing implications for the antitrust standing doctrine. 36 Those inter-
pretations suggest that the antitrust injury requirement is a rule of sub-
stance, permitting courts to dismiss otherwise meritorious cases under
the guise of a threshold standing issue.3 7 Some interpretations also con-
clude that courts can dismiss presumptively illegal antitrust claims be-
cause of the judge's ideological beliefs about the proper purposes of the
antitrust laws.3
8
There are several difficulties in both the language of the Brunswick
decision and the interpretations of the antitrust rule created in that case.
In the first place, the Court never identified the source - textual, inter-
pretative or prudential - for the antitrust injury rule set out in the
decision. Although it is probably safe to conclude that the source of the
rule is the language providing a private action for anyone injured by
"anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," the Court did not link its rule
that the plaintiff must establish "antitrust injury" to any statutory text.
Nor did the Court point to any source in the legislative history of section
4 which would define the meaning of the "antitrust injury" requirement.3 9
Instead, the Court held that the plaintiff's claimed injury in that case
"was not of the 'type of injury that the statute was intended to forestall',"
citing to a case in which a private right of action by the government was
M4 Id. at 489 n.14.
35 Id.
11 Those interpretations are identified in Calvani, The Mushrooming Bruns-
wick Defense: Injury to Competition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 324-
26 (1982).
31 This is a prevalent misconception about the Brunswick rule. In Ball Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1986),
the court said that Brunswick warns against granting relief to competitors injured
by an antitrust violation where their interests are different than consumers'. One
commentator interpreted Brunswick to hold that "reductions in profits attribut-
able to conduct by the defendant that preserves allocative efficiency or that in-
creases its productive efficiency cannot be recovered as damages." Page, Antitrust
Damages, supra note 7, at 484-85. See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTI.
TRUST LAW, par. 335.1c, at 231 (1986 Supplement).
" See, e.g., Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th
Cir. 1984).
11 The Court examined the congressional purposes of private actions under
section 4 to support its conclusion that the statute was "designed primarily as a
remedy." Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486 n.10.
1989]
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implied from a penal statute.4 0
The Court's lack of clarity about the source of the antitrust injury
requirement is disturbing for two reasons. First, it is apparent that the
process of discerning legislative policy in applying the textual require-
ment is not similar to the process of determining whether to imply a
private cause of action.41 The first process examines the language of the
statute and its legislative history to determine the existence of a legis-
lative intent to recognize a particular claim, while the latter process
invokes federalism concerns and attempts to discern the implication of
legislative interest in access to the federal courts. 42 Second, the Court's
failure to identify the source of the antitrust injury rule impedes the
process of categorizing the attributes of the rule as required by the text
of section 4 or created by the Court to reflect prudential concerns. The
process of distinguishing textually required law from judicially created
considerations is important because the power of Congress to create pri-
vate rights of action lies at the core of standing analysis. Furthermore,
to the extent that the antitrust injury requirement reflects purely judicial
concerns, it is subject to modification or disregard by Congress or the
courts.43
40 Id. at 487-88 (quoting Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202
(1967)). The Wyandotte case involved an action brought by the United States to
recover costs incurred in removing a negligently sunk vessel. In holding that the
government had an implied civil right of action under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, the Court held that:
[Olur reading of the Act does not lead us to the conclusion that Con-
gress must have intended the statutory remedies and procedures to
be exclusive of all others. There is no indication anywhere else - in
the legislative history of the Act, in the predecessor statutes, or in
nonstatutory law - that Congress might have intended that a party
who negligently sinks a vessel should be shielded from personal re-
sponsibility.
389 U.S. at 200.
4 See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1987); Nichol,
supra note 11, at 91.
42 In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court formulated a four part
standard for recognizing implied private rights of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," - that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legis-
lative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Although the Court has applied the Cort standard with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, it has not overruled the Cort standard. Compare Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979).
More fundamentally, the process of implying a private right of action under a
statute otherwise silent on the issue is fundamentally different than determining
the scope of a private right of action expressly created by statute.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1466.
[Vol. 37:2
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The Brunswick decision also fails to identify the precise relationship
between the antitrust injury requirement and antitrust standing doctrine.
The language of section 4 constrains litigable private antitrust actions
to those in which a plaintiff has been injured in his business or property
by conduct which violates the antitrust laws. The Brunswick holding
treats antitrust injury as a distinct element to the plaintiff's cause of
action and not as a logical and causal connection between the plaintiff's
damage and the defendant's conduct." However, in later cases, the Court
developed a multi-factor standing analysis which merely included a dem-
onstrated antitrust injury as a factor in determining whether the plaintiff
had standing.45 The lack of clarity concerning the nature of the antitrust
injury rule presents a fundamental issue of the Court's power to supple-
ment congressional requirements in a manner which makes the main-
tenance of private antitrust actions more difficult and impedes the
accomplishment of congressional purposes. 4 The more narrow reading of
Brunswick, which views the antitrust injury requirement as a part of the
causal requirement, is more faithful both to the congressional purposes
for section 4 and to notions of judicial deference to congressional prerog-
ative.
429 U.S. at 488. There is language in Brunswick which suggests that the
Court considered the antitrust injury requirement to be an aspect of the causation
requirement. In addressing the possibility that the plaintiffs method of meas-
uring damages might result in windfall profits, the Court held that:
it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was not "by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws": while respondents' loss
occurred "by reason of' the unlawful acquisition, it did not occur "by
reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful.
Id. at 488.
For example, in Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, the Court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the Union's allegations of consequential
harm resulting from a violation of the antitrust laws, although but-
tressed by an allegation of intent to harm the Union, are insufficient
as a matter of law. Other relevant factors - the nature of the Union's
injury, the tenuous and speculative character of the relationship be-
tween the alleged antitrust violation and the Union's alleged injury,
the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
damages, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged con-
spiracy - weigh heavily against judicial enforcement of the Union's
antitrust claim. Accordingly, we hold that ... the Union is not a person
injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the mean-
ing of § 4 of the Clayton Act.
459 U.S. at 545-46.
41 In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979), the Court stated: "[w]e
must take the statute [§ 4] as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages
remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to
antitrust violations." (emphasis in original)
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Another issue implicated by the Brunswick opinion concerns the Court's
creation of several non-textual considerations which condition an anti-
trust plaintiff's access to the federal courts. Some of these considerations
appear to exceed the textual requirements of section 4, while others ap-
pear to comport with congressional intent in creating a private right of
action. The Court, however, did not explain which considerations are
required by the text of section 4 and which are merely prudential. This
failure to identify the prudential, and judicial, nature of the rule has led
some courts and commentators to conclude that the antitrust injury rule
possesses independent substantive value and may be used to weed out
some antitrust claims on the merits.47 Antitrust standing, like other forms
of statutory standing, examines the relationships amongst the plaintiff,
his injury, the defendant's conduct, and the policies and values underlying
the substantive statute which proscribes the defendant's conduct. Any
standing doctrine represents a judicial standard which must seek to ad-
vance congressional or constitutional policy while ensuring proper insti-
tutional involvement by the courts.48 Standing doctrine, therefore, must
stress the statutory requirements creating the right of action and should
not be used to advance nonjurisdictional ends.49
There are several extra-textual considerations in Brunswick. First, the
language in Brunswick that a plaintiff must allege and prove an "injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent" adds to the
statutory standing requirement by suggesting that only certain types of
injuries, or injuries to certain types of interests, are actionable. The stat-
utory text, however, provides a private right of action to anyone injured
because of "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." The distinction
between the textual requirement and the Court's language may be sig-
nificant. Courts have conducted an inquiry into whether the plaintiffs
injury is of an appropriate type, notwithstanding a Supreme Court con-
clusion that the conduct which harmed the plaintiff was illegal.
50
41 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1986); Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 7, at 471-72, 492; P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 37, at 231.
' In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that
standing doctrine "subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and pruden-
tial considerations." The constitutional requirements, which derive from article
III, require a party seeking to invoke the powers of federal courts to demonstrate:
"'that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' .. . that the injury 'fairly can be
traced to the challenged action'... [and that the injury] 'is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision'." See also L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 107-08.
,9Nichol, supra note 11, at 73; L. TRBE, supra note 13, at 110; see also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (standing doctrine should look only "on the party
seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issue he wishes
to have adjudicated.")
50 See, e.g., Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409,
1417-20 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Second, the Brunswick Court also held that there exists an important
connection between the plaintiff's assertion of antitrust injury and the
manner in which he measures his damages. The Court objected to the
plaintiffs measurement of damages, concluding that the lost profits
claimed as damages bore "no relationship" to the substantive underpin-
nings of section 7's prohibitions.55 Indeed, the Brunswick holding can
reasonably be interpreted as involving only a judicial condemnation of
damage measurement theories which violently conflict with antitrust
policy.52 To the extent that Brunswick conditions access to the federal
courts on allegations of a proper method of measuring damages, it rep-
resents a judicial consideration which prevents courts from awarding
damages based upon speculative or inappropriate theories.
Third, the Brunswick Court also held that the plaintiffs injury "should
reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticom-
petitive acts made possible by the violation."5 3 This holding minimally
requires a close nexus between the plaintiff's injury and that which makes
the defendant's conduct violative of the antitrust laws. This requirement
underscores that nature of the Brunswick antitrust injury rule which
requires a causal link between the plaintiffs harm and the defendant's
conduct. 54 However, the language has been construed to require proof of
an anticompetitive effect from the defendant's conduct as a condition to
maintaining a private action under section 4.55 Although proof of an effect
on competition is an element of some substantive violations of antitrust
law,56 it has never been considered an ingredient to maintaining a private
right of action.
These non-textual considerations articulated by the Court in Brunswick
are capable of advancing or retarding the accomplishment of the congres-
sional objectives of section 4. Considerations which limit congressional
objective should be discarded and those which promote congressional pol-
icy should be retained. In all events the Court must identify the policy
justifications for any prudential consideration which adds to the textual
requirements.
51 429 U.S. at 485.
52 The Brunswick Court did not dismiss the plaintiffs case on the merits, but
rather held that normally a new trial on the damages claims is appropriate. Id.
at 489-90. The Court decided that a new trial on the damages issue was not
warranted because the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate any other acceptable
theories of damages. The Court stated that the plaintiffs "based their case solely
on their novel damages theory which we have rejected." Id. at 490.
13 Id. at 489.
See Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 7, at 490 ("Antitrust injury ...
defines the kinds of damages that will be compensable by identifying the aspects
of antitrust violations to which the plaintiff's injuries must be causally related.")
"See, e.g., Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1419-20.
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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Another issue implicated by Brunswick concerns the relationship be-
tween section 4's requirements and the substantive statute involved. 7 It
has been argued that Brunswick's formulation of an antitrust injury re-
quirement was intended to apply only to claims by a competitor under
section 7 of the Clayton Act.'8 This makes sense not only because of the
language of the Court's opinion, but also because claims that a merger
may tend to lessen competition are distinguishable from other claims
under the antitrust laws. 59 However, the Supreme Court, and the lower
courts, have applied the Brunswick rule in other types of cases,60 sug-
gesting that the antitrust injury requirement structured in Brunswick is
applicable to all claims for damages.
Recently, for example, the Court applied the Brunswick antitrust injury
standard in a most astonishing manner. In Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio,61 the Court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of
proof of antitrust injury at the summary judgment stage. The plaintiffs,
manufacturers and sellers of televisions, sued several Japanese or Jap-
anese-controlled corporations that manufacture and sell consumer elec-
tronic products. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to
fix maximum prices on products in Japan, fixed minimum prices in the
United States, entered into formal agreements with the Japanese gov-
ernment which established minimum prices (called "check prices") and
agreed to distribute their products in the United States according to a
"five-company rule," by which each Japanese producer was permitted to
sell to only five American distributors. 62 The Court held that summary
judgment was appropriately entered by the district court because the
plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the defendants engaged
in a price fixing conspiracy. However, the Court, in dicta, observed that
the plaintiffs could not recover damages for any conspiracy to charge
higher than competitive prices because such conduct would benefit, and
r7 In Brunswick, the Court correctly noted that "[i]ntermeshing a statutory
prohibition against acts that have a potential to cause certain harms with a
damages action intended to remedy those harms is not without difficulty." 429
U.S. at 486.
51 H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 374.5
1 Id. at 374.
- See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981)(applied Brunswick analysis to a private action alleging illegal price discrimi-
nation under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act); Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1985)(no antitrust injury suffered by actions to defeat issuance of revenue bonds);
Chrysler Corp. v. Feders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 893 (1981) (no antitrust injury from refusal to make payments under purchase
agreement); Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980) (no antitrust injury by refusal
to sell power to mall).
61 475 U.S. 574 (1986).6 ld. at 580-81.
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not harm, the plaintiffs.63 The Court also held that the evidence of the
alleged conspiracies to restrain trade could not serve as circumstantial
evidence of a broader conspiracy to monopolize the American market by
pricing below the market level because those conspiracies could not have
caused the plaintiffs any injury.64
The antitrust injury requirement described in Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial is fundamentally different than the rule set out in Brunswick,
although the broad, undefined nature of the Brunswick rule permits its
use for achieving nonjurisdictional ends. At its narrowest and most pre-
cise point, the antitrust injury rule connects the plaintiff's damages, ap-
propriately measured, and that aspect of the defendant's conduct which
contravenes substantive antitrust law. If there is a close causal relation-
ship, congressional purposes are met. The rule was not intended to be
used to dispose of claims on the merits or to permit judicial disregard of
statements of positive law.
b. An Intermediate Analysis: The Merger of Antitrust
Injury and Antitrust Standing
Following the Brunswick case, the Court decided two cases involving
statutory standing in private antitrust actions. Unfortunately, the Court's
Although the issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was the sufficiency of
proof of conspiracy, the Court took the opportunity to discuss "what [plaintiffs']
claim is not." Id. at 582 (emphasis in original). The Court first stated that the
American antitrust laws have no extraterritorial effect and that the plaintiffs
cannot recover damages for cartel activity in Japan. The Court continued:
Nor can [plaintiffs] recover damages for any conspiracy by [defend-
ants] to charge higher than competitive prices in the American mar-
ket. Such conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, but it could
not injure [plaintiffs]; as [defendants'] competitors, [plaintiffs] stand
to gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price in [consumer
electronic products]. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,
429 U.S. 477, 488-489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, [plaintiffs]
cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose nonprice restraints that
have the effect of either raising market price or limiting output. Such
restrictions, though harmful to competition, actually benefit compet-
itors by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, nei-
ther [defendants'] alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the
five company rule that limited distribution in this country, nor the
check prices insofar as they established minimum prices in this coun-
try, can by themselves give [plaintiffs] a cognizable claim against
[defendants] for antitrust damages. The Court of Appeals therefore
erred to the extent that it found evidence of these alleged conspiracies
to be "direct evidence" of a conspiracy that injured [plaintiffs].
Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
6 Id. at 582-85 & n.7. The Court stated that irrespective of the claims of alleged
conspiracies, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were harmed by the con-
spiratorial conduct and that the more narrow conspiracies (i.e., to raise prices in
Japan, impose the "five-company rule", and the "check price" requirement) cannot
have caused the plaintiffs any injury.
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decisions in those cases added more uncertainty than clarity. In Blue
Shield v. McCready,6 the Court examined the effect of the statutory
standing requirements on a health insurance subscriber who was used
as a pawn in a competitive battle between health care providers. The
plaintiff, a group health plan subscriber, received treatment from a psy-
chologist and sued the insurer contending that the insurer and psychi-
atrists had conspired to restrain competition by excluding clinical
psychologists from the reimbursement plans. The defendants argued that
the plaintiff subscriber lacked standing to sue because the objective of
the alleged boycott was an exclusion of clinical psychologists from a seg-
ment of the psychotherapy market and that the plaintiffs injury had only
a remote and indirect relationship to the defendants' objective or purpose
in imposing the restraint. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that
the plaintiff, as an insurance plan subscriber, had standing to maintain
the action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The Court held that section 4 permits recovery by a private party
plaintiff only if he or she sustained injuries which are not too remote
from the antitrust violation.66 The Court stated that the questions of
relationship between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's actions
can be resolved by looking at: first, the physical and economic nexus
between the alleged violation and the harm to the plaintiff, and; second,
to the relationship of the alleged injury with those forms of injury with
which Congress was concerned in making the defendant's conduct illegal
and in providing a private remedy under section 4.67 The Court found
that the plaintiff had suffered antitrust injury because her harm was a
"necessary step" in effecting the purpose of the conspiracy and was "inex-
tricably intertwined" with the injury defendants sought to inflict on the
psychotherapy market.6 Thus, the Court seemed to closely link the an-
titrust injury element with the requirement that the plaintiff establish
a causal nexus between the defendant's anticompetitive conduct and the
plaintiff's injury.
The Court's treatment of the causation element in section 4 appears to
incorporate traditional tort principles of proximate cause into federal
antitrust law. 69 However, the Court's conclusion that the plaintiff suffered
antitrust injury because her welfare was interwoven with the interests
of the real targets of the antitrust scheme suggests that the causation
and antitrust injury elements are identical in nature. The Court's decision
457 U.S. 465 (1982).
Id. at 478-79.
67 Id. at 478.
Id. at 479, 484.
69 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 n.13 (1982). The Court surveyed
the various standards or tests for determining the causal connection between the
plaintiffs injury and the violation of substantive antitrust law, including the
"target area," "direct injury," "factual matrix," and "zone of interests" tests. Id.
at 476 & n.12.
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also articulates a prudential consideration which permits antitrust stand-
ing where the plaintiff suffers injury indirectly as a result of the defend-
ant's anticompetitive scheme to injure another party.70
In a subsequent case, Associated General Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters71 , the Court reviewed the issue of antitrust stand-
ing, this time in the context of labor union activity, and seemingly re-
treated from its broadly stated rule in Blue Shield v. McCready. The case
involved a suit by several unions (Unions) against a multi-employer as-
sociation (Association) claiming that the Association and its members
had coerced third parties and some Union members into dealing with
non-union firms. The Unions asserted a claim that the Association had
created a boycott aimed at harming the Unions' members.
In reversing the circuit court's grant of standing, the Supreme Court
first considered the alleged restraints of trade in the relevant market for
construction contracting and subcontracting. According to the Unions'
complaint, the defendants coerced customers and potential customers,
such as landowners and general contractors (i.e., the defendants them-
selves and their competitors) to give some of their business to non-union
firms. Thus, some victims of the coercive behavior may have diverted
contracts to non-union firms and thereby caused the loss of some business
by unionized subcontractors.72 The Court conceded that this coercive be-
havior may be an antitrust violation, but held that the existence of a
violation does not necessarily mean that the union was injured by reason
of an antitrust violation. Rather, the injury may have been inflicted on
coerced customers or the defendants' competitors, and not on the plaintiff
Unions or their members.
73
The Court stated that the "by reason of' language in section 4 of the
Clayton Act imposed a requirement that the courts must "evaluate the
plaintiff's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the re-
lationship between them. '74 The Court examined the type and nature of
the plaintiffs' alleged injuries and contrasted it with the conventional
view that the antitrust laws were intended to protect consumers and
competitors. 7 The Unions, according to the Court, were neither customers
70 See 457 U.S. at 481-84. See also Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d
739, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1984).
71 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
72 Id. at 528.
73 Id.
71 Id. at 535.
71 Id. at 539.
76 d.
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nor competitors in the market in which trade was restrained. 76 Further-
more, the Court believed it significant that the Unions would not nec-
essarily have their interests served by unfettered competition in the
relevant market, and indeed may have their interests impeded by un-
inhibited competition. 77 The Court held that the challenged activities
were not the type of injury Congress was interested in protecting against
in passing the Sherman Act.78 Thus, according to the Court, the plaintiff
did not satisfy the antitrust injury element in its private action under
section 4.
The Court described a number of other "factors" relating to an antitrust
plaintiffs standing to sue, including: the defendant's intent to commit
an anticompetitive act, causation-in-fact, the directness of the injury as
measured by the presence of more immediate victims with a motive to
sue, the speculative nature of the claim for damages, and judicial concerns
with potential double recoveries and complex apportionment of dam-
ages. 79 The Court found that the intent and causation-in-fact elements
had been established, but that the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient
facts to establish other factors and therefore lacked standing to sue. 80
There are a number of issues presented by the Court's decision in
Associated General Contractors and its relationship to the antitrust stand-
ing doctrine. The Court's analysis proposed a balancing standard to de-
termine antitrust standing, but the Court failed to determine whether
the antitrust injury requirement was a separate element in a private
action. The Court's failure to explain the relationship between the an-
titrust standing doctrine and the antitrust injury requirement leaves a
noticeable void in the understanding of textual and non-textual standing
requirements. The Court did not explain the significance of the defend-
ant's intent to engage in anticompetitive behavior as a factor in the
plaintiffs standing to sue. Intent is a difficult issue to factor into a thresh-
old standing requirement unless the applicability of the requirement
depends on the severity of the violation.8' The Court also stressed the
potential for double recoveries against the same defendant as a consid-
eration in the standing to sue analysis. This factor appears to be non-
textual and prudential; it reflects judicial concerns about both Congress'
intent in providing a private right of action in section 4 and the ability
77 Id.781 Id. at 540.
791 Id. at 537-45.
goId.
1' As discussed later, the Court has shown little interest in changing the nature
of the standing to sue analysis according to the plaintiff's allegation of a per se
or rule of reason claim. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. The issue of
the defendant's intent may be important, however, where participants are used
by defendants in "a purposefully anticompetitive scheme" aimed at competitors.
Cf. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. at 483.
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of the courts to equitably impose multiple damage awards for the same
conduct.8 2 The Court did not, however, indicate the appropriate manner
of applying the balancing standard for determining antitrust standing,
nor did the Court give any guidance on the relative importance of each
factor.
c. Unbundling Antitrust Injury and Antitrust Standing
The Court's decisions in cases involving the standing and antitrust
injury doctrines have been the subject of criticism because of the perceived
uncertainty associated with the opinions.8 3 More particularly, the deci-
sions have been criticized because the balancing standard established in
Associated General Contractors and Blue Shield failed to give guidance
to antitrust litigants and the courts and because the antitrust injury
requirement established in Brunswick was vague.84 Moreover, the Court's
standing and antitrust injury cases were criticized because the Court
failed to address several issues central to an understanding of the stand-
ing doctrine. Some of those unresolved issues were addressed in a recent
case.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.88 , the Court held that a
competitor lacked standing to enjoin the merger of the second and third
largest beef packers, when it claimed that it was threatened with lost
profits from a possible post-merger, cost-price squeeze pricing plan. The
Court held that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief under section 16 of
the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, just as plaintiffs
seeking damages under section 4 must demonstrate antitrust injury.86
"2 The Court's prudential concerns about the unfairness of awarding duplicative
damages have been reflected in several cases. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 264 (1972), the Court, interpreting the "business or property" require-
ment, expressed grave concerns with "the problems of double recovery inherent
in allowing damages" to the State for injuries to consumers. Later, in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court prevented plaintiffs remote in
the chain of distribution from the defendant's unlawful conduct from measuring
damages by the amount of overcharge passed through the chain. The Court ruled
that the plaintiffs' overcharge damage measurement created an unacceptable risk
of duplicative recoveries against the defendants. Id. at 730-31.
See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1449.
See, e.g., Calvani, supra note 36, at 324; Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust
Injury and the Per Se Standard, 93 YALE L.J. 1309 (1984).
479 U.S. 104 (1986).
Id. at 111. The Court, relying on the language of section 16 of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. § 26) held that the plaintiffs must show proof of "threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." The Court reasoned that despite
differences between the language and purpose of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act, it would be anomalous to permit a plaintiff to seek an injunction against a
threatened injury for which it would not be entitled to recover damages if the
injury actually occurred. Id. at 110-11. However, the Court recognized that there
were some fundamental differences between private actions for damages under
section 4 and actions for injunctive relief under section 16. In particular, the Court
noted the important considerations under section 4 that there may be more di-
rectly injured victims and whether there is a risk of duplicative recovery or
complex apportionment of damages would not be relevant under section 16. Id.
at 111 n.6.
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The Court considered that Monfort's injury from the threatened cost-price
squeeze was not antitrust injury because absent below-cost, predatory
pricing, that active price competition to increase market share was pro-
competitive.87 The Court held that antitrust injury is not simply a factor
to be balanced in the standing equation, but rather "a showing of antitrust
injury is necessary ... to establish standing under section 4."81 The Court
also indicated that antitrust injury, while necessary to maintain a private
action, may not be sufficient to confer standing where, for example, other
factors identified in antitrust standing cases have not been satisfied.8 9
The Court's Cargill decision provides some answers to the standing
doctrine enigmas created by prior cases, but creates another complexity,
which is addressed in the next section. The description of antitrust injury
as a separate element in a private cause of action resolves a question
unanswered in Brunswick, and it is unclear whether it reflects the textual
requirements of section 4. The text of section 4 seems to envision the
causal and antitrust injury requirements as a set of interrelated inquires:
do the plaintiffs damages result from the defendant's conduct and does
that conduct violate substantive antitrust law. Separating the causal
requirement from the requirement that the defendant violate the anti-
trust laws does not seem to advance the standing analysis in any mean-
ingful manner and it may retard the advancement of legislative objectives
in section 4 by permitting nonjurisdictional decisions.90 The Cargill de-
cision does not recognize distinctions between statutory requirements and
the non-textual considerations forming the antitrust injury rule. Further,
the Court again failed to identify the relevance of substantive antitrust
law in fashioning either the antitrust injury rule or antitrust standing
doctrine.
d. The Issue of Public Injury
The Court's standing cases have not recognized different treatment for
per se offenses and rule of reason offenses. For example, the offenses
alleged in the Associated General Contractors and Matsushita Electric
Industrial cases arguably fit in categories of per se offenses. The offense
alleged in Blue Shield v. McCready arguably states a vertical nonprice
restraint, which is analyzed under the rule of reason.9 1 From a doctrinal
871 Id. at 114-17. The Court conceded that standing would be conferred by threat-
ened injury in the form of potential market exclusion produced by sustained
predatory pricing, but pointed out that the plaintiff had failed to raise a predatory
pricing claim in the district court. Id. at 117-19.
88Id. at 110 n.5.89 Id. at 110 n.5, 111 n.6.
90 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
9' See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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perspective, then, the same considerations underlie the determination of
antitrust injury and standing in a plaintiff's private cause of action in
per se and rule of reason cases. This perspective implicitly recognizes
that the concept of standing links the plaintiffs injury to the defendant's
conduct which must contravene some established statutory or common
law rule, irrespective of whether the substantive violation causes pres-
umptive injury or not.92 In other words, the text of section 4 requires only
that the plaintiff identify a plausible connection between his injury and
some conduct by the defendant that violates the antitrust laws.
The Court in Cargill, however, implied that the plaintiff could establish
antitrust injury only by demonstrating below-cost, predatory pricing. 93
This dicta, which can be traced to imprecise language in Brunswick
9 4
has led some lower courts to conclude that a plaintiff must allege and
demonstrate predatory pricing as a condition to maintaining a lawsuit
for price fixing.95 This view of antitrust injury imports another prudential
consideration into the standing equation, i.e., that the plaintiff must show
a "public injury" to competition. Any requirement that the plaintiff prove
predatory pricing is an inappropriate consideration for a standing anal-
ysis because it clearly goes to the merits of the plaintiffs case. The notion
that a private plaintiff must show public injury has been rejected by the
Supreme Court in cases involving the substantive requirements of the
Sherman Act.98 Further, the Court in Brunswick rejected a similar ar-
gument, concluding that antitrust plaintiffs need not prove an actual
lessening of competition to recover under section 4.97
B. The Current State of the Antitrust Standing Doctrine
The preceding analysis demonstrates the inadequacy of the Court's
standing analysis. It is apparent that the Court's standing doctrine is
See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d at 1418-19.
93479 U.S. at 117-18 (1986). The Court drew a distinction for purpose of an-
titrust injury analysis between "price cutting aimed simply at increasing market
share" and predatory pricing, which was defined as "pricing below an appropriate
measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and
reducing competition in the long run."
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1420. The Seventh Circuit interpreted Cargill
as follows:
Under the Court's analysis, the former is vigorous competition; only
the latter is anticompetitive and capable of inflicting antitrust injury
.... In our view ... nonpredatory pricing is competitive pricing that
cannot inflict antitrust injury upon a competitor.
Id.
See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
429 U.S. at 489 n.14.
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confused because it encourages judicial reactions to antitrust claims on
the merits and does not advance a threshold analysis of textual require-
ments and prudential considerations. The antitrust standing doctrine
lacks pertinence and instrumental significance because courts can select
from an extensive menu of factors to arrive at a decision about standing
to sue, but there is no guidance about the relative importance of those
factors, nor, for that matter, do many of the articulated factors bear any
demonstrated relevance to antitrust policy. The Court has frequently
expressed the importance of analysis concerning the existence of antitrust
injury but has not defined the role of the requirement in antitrust stand-
ing doctrine.
It is also apparent that the Court's treatment of antitrust standing has
lost its moorings in congressional policy. Various imprecise interpreta-
tions of the Brunswick holding have distorted the antitrust injury re-
quirement beyond legislative intention and have permitted the gradual
abandonment of the objectives of section 4. The tortured development of
the antitrust injury requirement from its ambiguous inception in Bruns-
wick to its manifestation as a substantive rule in Matsushita Electrical
Industrial shows the need for more judicial precision in defining the rule
and greater fidelity to congressional prerogative in section 4.
II. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST STANDING
AND ANTITRUST INJURY DOCTRINES
It is possible to define the antitrust injury doctrine in a manner that
accommodates traditional antitrust values and the contemporary views
about the proper purposes of the antitrust laws. This process of accom-
modation requires a coherent analysis by the Supreme Court and must
be based upon a sound analytic foundation that advances the values
explicit and inherent in antitrust policy. The fundamental guides to a
coherent analysis of the antitrust injury requirement are (1) congres-
sional policy expressed in section 4; (2) antitrust policy which is reflected
in the legislative history of the substantive provisions of the antitrust
laws and in judicial interpretations of the antitrust laws; and (3) a cogent
process for "intermeshing" the substantive and procedural provisions of
the antitrust laws.
A. Statutory Standing
The most useful way of approaching the issue of an appropriate stand-
ard for antitrust standing is to recognize that Congress has established
by statute the elements or requirements for bringing a private action.
Antitrust standing is therefore similar to the standing analysis where
Congress has established a statute granting private rights of action for
violations of a substantive statute. A close analogy is private actions for
judicial review of administrative agency decisions. These cases involve a
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procedural statute granting a private right of action to "persons ag-
grieved" by an agency decision which violates substantive rights.9 The
analogy between standing to seek review of agency decision-making and
antitrust standing is close because private actions under section 4 involve
the vindication of claims arising under substantive antitrust law but
which are governed by the procedural requirements of section 4.
The issue of standing to sue principally involves a judicial determi-
nation of congressional intent for a statutory grant of a cause of action
and a determination of whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff
access to the federal courts.99 The standing issue, then, presents sensitive
issues of separation of powers and the judiciary's application of its tra-
ditional expertise at interpreting statutes. 100 The tension represented by
separation of powers concerns is most acute where a court attempts to
engraft onto congressional requirements other prudential concerns or
judicially compelled considerations that demonstrably affect standing
analysis.' 0'
Statutory standing is generally approached through two sorts of in-
quiries: first, whether the plaintiff has sufficient interest in the case to
warrant access to the federal courts; and second, whether the plaintiff is
a proper party to raise the substantive issue involved in the case. 10 2 The
access inquiry asks whether the party seeking a federal forum for the
adjudication of a claim has demonstrated some harm to an interest cog-
nizable by law. 03 The interest involved in the case may be recognized by
the courts, the Congress or the Constitution. 0 4 When access standing is
defined by statute the pertinent inquiry is whether the congressional
language has sufficiently articulated a public value, the violation of which
permits access to the courts.10 5
98 See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982), provides
for a private right of action to any person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute."
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1466.l0 Nichol, supra note 11, at 91; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1459-61.
10l Nichol, supra note 11, at 71-72, 90-92; Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:
A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 678 (1977) (some issues must
be left to courts).
102 The analysis of statutory standing is derived from three sources: Sunstein,
supra note 11; Nichol, supra note 11; Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court - A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973).
103 Nichol, supra note 11, at 89.
1Id. at 89-91.
105 Id. at 91. The formulation of a public value which the Congress intended to
be advanced is not always an easy task, but the Supreme Court has frequently
granted standing to parties seeking to vindicate claims under statutes which the
Court has construed to possess values worth protecting. See, e.g., Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (granting standing to "persons
aggrieved" to claim a protectable interest in the "social benefits of living in an
integrated community"); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1978)
(interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1968 to confer on "all 'persons' a legal right to
truthful information about available housing.").
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The issue inquiry assumes the presence of some legally protectable
interest by the plaintiff, but questions whether the plaintiff is the ap-
propriate party to press the issues and claims raised in the case. 10 6 This
inquiry requires an assessment of the relationship between the plaintiff
as a proper party to vindicate the asserted claims and the reach of the
substantive law implicated by those claims.
0 7
The issue inquiry has traditionally been approached via a zone of in-
terest test.0 8 This test considers whether a statutory scheme evidences
a congressional desire to benefit a particular class of litigants, and focuses
judicial attention on the nexus between the plaintiffs asserted injury and
the substantive claims presented for review. 0 9 The Supreme Court has
noted that the issue really concerns congressional intent; that is, whether
the plaintiff is the type of litigant that Congress intended to protect from
substantive violations of law.110 The zone of interest test, then, involves
a standing to sue approach which emphasizes the intermeshing of statutes
recognizing private rights of actions and statutes which create substan-
tive rights and duties.
In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the zone of interest test in a case involving claims by a beneficiary
of agency action, a nonregulated trade association."1 The Court held that
106 Nichol, supra note 11, at 95. "Issue standing, however, asks not whether a
litigant may invoke federal jurisdiction, but whether he is an appropriate party
to present the constitutional claim. Emphasis is no longer on the plaintiffs per-
sonal stake in the controversy, but on the litigant's relationship to the legal claims
he presents."
107 Scott, supra note 102, at 684.
108 See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 394-403. The zone
of interest test was first articulated in Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and more fully developed in Investment Co. Inst.
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Those cases articulate the nature and reach of the
zone of interest test. The Data Processing Court noted that the standing issue is
really one of interpreting congressional intent because "Congress can, of course,
resolve the question one way or another, save as the requirements of Article III
dictate otherwise." 397 U.S. at 154. According to the Court, the significant in-
quiries concerned whether the plaintiffs were the type of parties that the statutory
policy attempted to protect and whether the injuries they suffered were of the
type that Congress attempted to prevent in passing the substantive law. 397 U.S.
at 157; 401 U.S. at 620-21.
109 Nichol, supra note 11, at 96-97.
110 See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 396-99; Block v. Com-
munity Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347-51. The Court, in cases involving the
right to seek judicial review from agency decisions, has recognized a presumption
in favor of judicial review, but has held that the presumption may be overcome
when congressional intent to preclude judicial review is "fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme." Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. at 351 (quoting
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., 397 U.S. at 157).
, The standing issue was implicated because the substantive statute involved,
the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36, regulated banks. The plaintiff was a trade
association representing securities brokers, underwriters, and investment bank-
ers who sued to compel the Comptroller to enforce provisions of the Act which,
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a nonregulated litigant can seek judicial review of agency action, unless
its interests "are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the pur-
poses implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit.1' 12 The Court stressed that the
applicable test was not intended to be "especially demanding" and that
"there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-
be plaintiff."113 The Clarke Court then engaged in a traditional analysis
of discerning congressional purpose, stressing in that case the policy im-
plications inherent in the "overall context" of the legislative scheme. 114
The analysis used by the Court to determine whether a litigant pos-
sesses standing to seek judicial review of an agency decision which ad-
versely affects him is useful in describing an appropriate standard for
antitrust standing. In both situations a procedural statute grants a pri-
vate right of action to persons who have been harmed by violations of
substantive law. In both situations, the substantive law creates the reach
of the statute and, together with the procedural law creating the right
of action, defines the class of persons who are entitled to protection. The
zone of interests standard properly forces judicial decision-making on the
important causal issue of whether Congress intended to redress the plain-
tiffs injury. Traditional standing analysis views the zone of interest
standard as a prudential consideration in public law adjudication."15 In
antitrust standing analysis, however, the identical causal relationship is
partially compelled by the language of section 4 and partially imposed
by prudential considerations shaped by case law. The following section
applies a statutory standing model to private antitrust actions.
B. Antitrust Standing - A Statutory Standing Model
The following sections apply a statutory model of standing to private
action for damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. This analysis
proceeds on the belief that antitrust standing is fundamentally no dif-
ferent than standing issues under other statutory schemes. The first part
examines the textual requirements of section 4 to determine, from the
statutory language, the nomenclature of a private action and to discern
plaintiff contended, limited banks from engaging in discount brokerage activities.
479 U.S. 388. Clearly, the McFadden Act did not address the right of nonbanking
entities to challenge substantive provisions of the Act and the Comptroller
claimed that the plaintiff lacked standing because it was not within the zone of
interests protected by the act.
112 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
113Id. at 399-400, citing Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
114 479 U.S. at 401-403.
11 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (zone of interest test applied to find standing
for claims asserted under the commerce clause).
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from that language the congressional intent underlying section 4. The
second part reviews purposes and objectives of private antitrust rights of
action under section 4 as demonstrated in the overall context of the stat-
utory scheme and the legislative history. The final section examines some
prudential considerations which courts may properly recognize to shape
the decision on whether litigants should have standing to maintain pri-
vate actions for damages.
1. Defining the Text of Section 4: The Language and
Meaning of the Statute
As a threshold matter, section 4 provides a private right of action by
requiring that the plaintiff allege and prove that he was "injured ... by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." To recover damages
the plaintiff must have suffered some economic injury that flows from,
or is causally related to, the defendant's violation of the antitrust laws.
There are two principal components to the textual requirements under
section 4. First, the statute requires that the plaintiff possess a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the case to ensure that he properly
vindicates the purposes of the antitrust laws. This requirement that the
plaintiff suffer injury to his business or property, i.e., an economic injury,
ensures that the plaintiff has suffered injury in fact. At the core of any
standing doctrine, then, is the requirement that the plaintiff have a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the case; that is, the plaintiff has suffered
an injury caused by defendants conduct which violates some substantive
provision of the law. 116
The second textual component requires that the plaintiffs injury must
be related to that aspect of the defendant's conduct which violates the
antitrust laws. This nexus or causal component insures that the plaintiffs
injury is related to conduct which violates the substantive antitrust law.
This aspect of antitrust standing functions like the zone of interest test
in statutory standing cases and requires a consideration of whether the
plaintiff is a proper party to litigate the claims asserted, and asks whether
the plaintiff has asserted a sufficiently close connection between his in-
juries and the statutory objectives. 117 Moreover, the language of section
4 requires judicial consideration of the causal nexus between injury and
anticompetitive behavior.
16 The requirement that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of
his antitrust action is directly analogous to standing requirements in public law
actions, such as the vindication of constitutional rights or the right to judicial
review of agency action. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 111-12. The principal function
served by an injury requirement is to diminish the likelihood that outsiders or
intermeddlers will be able to interfere with beneficial arrangements; that is,
whether the plaintiff is the type of litigant that Congress wished to benefit from
the statutory scheme. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1462.
117 The causation requirement in standing analysis requires consideration of
whether the plaintiff's harms are probabilistic or systemic, on the one hand, or
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The litigant should be granted standing where there is some "indicia
- however slight - that the litigant before the court was intended to
be protected, benefited or regulated by the statute under which the suit
is brought."118 Where the plaintiff has asserted claims that fall within
the zone of interests Congress sought to protect by passage of the Sherman
Act and Clayton Act, standing should be recognized. Allegations that the
plaintiff has suffered an economic injury to his business or property and
that the injury flows from conduct proscribed by positive antitrust law
should presumptively create access to the federal courts.
The direct causal standard described in the preceding paragraphs
greatly simplifies the antitrust standing analysis. It advances the textual
requirements of section 4 and accomplishes the same jurisprudential ob-
jectives served by its analogous application in public law litigation; i.e.,
it forces judicial attention toward interpretations of congressional intent
and away from nonjurisdictional ends. It provides a useful, and institu-
tionally sound, method of linking individual harms to the congressional
interests pursued by section 4.119 Those interests which Congress sought
to advance by the antitrust laws are set out in the following section.
2. Policy Objectives of the Antitrust Laws
A great deal of the commentary on the antitrust standing doctrine is
directed at discovering the objectives of the antitrust laws.120 This invi-
tation to examine the legislative history is required by the language of
section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides a private right of action for
injuries suffered by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.
individual, on the other. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1463. Examination of the
causation requirement in antitrust standing is therefore simplified because in-
dividual harm is required in many antitrust causes of action. However, in some
actions, such as challenges to mergers, the harm may be probabilistic or systemic
and the causation analysis more closely resembles standing to review agency
action. Cf. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487 (noting the difficult problems of inter-
meshing section 4 with statutory prohibition against acts which potentially cause
harm).
118 Public Citizen v. F.T.C., 869 F.2d 1541, 1547 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting
Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
"I The zone of interest standard has been attacked as unsuitable in discerning
antitrust standing. Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1483-84. Professor
Page argues that the zone of interest is too imprecise and non-economic to serve
adequately any role of culling out improper claims from proper claims. According
to his analysis, the only proper measure of any standing analysis is its ability to
provide optimum deterrence to the antitrust laws. Id. This argument, however,
is built entirely upon the fragile premises that the only objective of antitrust
policy is the advancement of allocative efficiency and the only objective of private
antitrust actions is deterrence. Id. at 1450-52, 1483-84; see also Page, Antitrust
Damages, supra note 7, at 471-73. Neither of these premises is supported by the
law.121 See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 7, at 1471.
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It is also necessitated by the holding in the Brunswick case linking to-
gether substantive violations of the antitrust laws, a causal connection
between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's conduct, and the need
for demonstrated antitrust injury.121 Finally, as discussed in the preceding
section, an examination of legislature purposes and the scheme of the
statutory scheme is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff is an
appropriate litigant to vindicate claims under the antitrust laws. There
are essentially two problems raised by these intersections between leg-
islative purpose and the antitrust standing doctrine: First, there is no
consensus on a hierarchy of purposes of the antitrust laws, and, second,
there is no agreement on how recognized purposes should influence stand-
ing doctrine.
The search for a definite statement of objectives or purposes of the
substantive antitrust laws - particularly the Sherman Act - has oc-
cupied antitrust scholars for many years.' 22 Some commentators have
concluded that maximization of economic efficiency is the single purpose
of the antitrust laws.123 They assert that the drafters of the Sherman Act
intended that the Act be interpreted to enhance the proper allocation of
economic resources. This basic theme has two aspects: first, that the goal
of the antitrust laws is to improve consumer welfare and, second, that
the proper goal is to make the production and allocation of goods more
efficient by expanding output or reducing costs. 1 4 Other commentators
have stressed the importance of other objectives - including populism,
protection of small businesses, technological progress - which also reflect
the legislative policy of the antitrust laws.' 25 Indeed, even the Supreme
Court has identified various objectives that it believes motivated Congress
12, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 (1987); Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981);
Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints:
The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust
Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125 (1987). For an excellent review of the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court at the time of its early antitrust standing cases, see Sullivan,
The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First
Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1982).
123 See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 50-133 (1978); R. POSNER, AN-
TITRUST LAW 103-13 (1978); Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1451.
"2 See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1449-51 (concluding that
any antitrust liability rules must be dictated by an economic efficiency standard);
I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 7-25 (1978) (concluding that the "eco-
nomic objective of a pro-competition policy is to maximize consumer economic
welfare through efficiency in the use and allocation of scarce resources, and via
progressiveness in the development of new productive techniques and new prod-
ucts that put those resources to better use.")
125 See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 122; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original
and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretations Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Pitefsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 1051 (1979).
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in passing the antitrust laws, including the advancement of consumer
welfare, the protection of small businessmen, populism, and the preven-
tion of misuse of economic power.
126
There is also active debate about the purposes of the private right of
action for damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Commentators
have argued that there is a single objective for the private right of action,
as revealed by the legislative history of the antitrust laws, which is to
deter further anticompetitive behavior. 127 For example, it has been argued
that the antitrust injury rule articulated in Brunswick promotes the de-
terrence function by requiring the dismissal of lawsuits which provide
suboptimal penalties or in which private losses do not approximate the
net efficiency loss created by the unlawful behavior. 128 This economic
approach is premised on belief that economic efficiency is the sole criterion
for evaluation of substantive antitrust law and that the objectives of the
substantive and procedural antitrust law merge in a manner which sub-
ordinates private compensatory interests to public deterrent objectives. 12 9
This is a narrow view of antitrust norms because both the legislative
history of section 4 and a relatively consistent line of judicial interpre-
tation of legislative objectives have concluded that deterrence is not the
single objective to private enforcement of the antitrust laws. There is a
strong record of congressional recognition of the need to compensate vic-
tims of antitrust violations for their losses.130 The damages provision,
according to one sponsor, was "intended to provide for enforcement of the
Act through 'reliance on self policing capacity of business' by granting
126 See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)
(recognizing that section 1 of the Sherman Act was intended to (1) provide inde-
pendence and opportunity for "small dealers and worthy men," (2) provide freedom
of choice for shippers, (3) fair prices and freedom of choice for ultimate customers,
and (4) a market governed by competition rather than by private agreement).
See E. Fox & L. SULLrVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 44 (1989).
1217 See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1451-52.
128 Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 7, at 475-76.
129 Id. at 472-73; Page, Antitrust Liability, supra note 7, at 1450-59.
130 The history of the remedial provisions of section 4 is set out in ABA Antitrust
Section, Monograph No. 13, Treble-Damages Remedy 16-21 (1986) [hereinafter Tre-
ble-Damages Remedy]. The debates on the bills which eventually resulted in the
Sherman Act demonstrate substantial congressional interest in providing incen-
tives to private parties to bring actions under the statute and to compensate them
for their injuries. Id. Senator Sherman argued that the bill was a "remedial
statute" giving the federal courts the power to prevent monopolies, and, in dis-
cussing the private damage remedy, he stated:
The measure of damages, whether merely compensatory, putative (sic]
or vindictive, is a matter of detail depending upon the judgment of
Congress. My own opinion is that the damages should be commen-
surate with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a
combination such as is described.
Id. at 17-18, quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2456.
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an injured businessman damages that '[m]ake it worth his while' to sue
if he is injured."13 1
Moreover, there are clear statements by the Supreme Court of the
importance of the compensatory function of private actions.'3' The Court
frequently referred broadly to the objectives of section 4 as the protection
of consumers and businessmen against anticompetitive behavior, the pro-
motion of suits by private attorneys general to deter antitrust violations,
and the compensation of victims of anticompetitive conduct. 33 In fact, the
Brunswick Court, after noting that the treble damage feature of section
4 serves "an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring
wrongdoing," averred to the section as "designed primarily as a rem-
edy."134
Although there is no consensus that definitively ranks the many ob-
jectives articulated by Congress in enacting the Sherman Act, the ad-
vancement of congressional policies represented by section 4 should not
be impeded. Moreover, congressional desire to advance two objectives -
deterrence and compensation - by creation of a private right of action
should not retard the development of a just and efficient antitrust stand-
ing doctrine. Accommodation of substantive and procedural statutory
objectives should proceed according to the following general precepts.
First, there must be judicial respect for the political implications of stat-
utory norms. If Congress desires to accomplish dual objectives in provid-
ing a private right of action, courts must advance those objectives. 3 5
Second, courts must recognize that there are qualitative differences be-
tween the articulation of objectives under section 4 and the more general
policies of the Sherman Act. Congress clearly identified its purpose in
section 4 as advancing the full range of roles performed by the private
attorneys general vindicating private and public interests. Third, ad-
vancement of procedural objectives can proceed independent of the clas-
sification of the goals of substantive antitrust law. Courts must make
decisions concerning the merits of a plaintiffs claim, but this process of
13'Treble-Damages Remedy, supra note 130, at 18 (quoting 2 G. HOAR, AUTO-
BIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 363 (1903)).
132 See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) ("the lack of
restrictive language reflects Congress' 'expansive remedial purpose' in enacting§ 4: Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter
violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide
ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations.").
-8 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312(1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,486 n.10 (1977).
1" 429 U.S. at 485-86.
135 The Supreme Court has frequently recognized the importance of the prin-
ciple of institutional deference in the context of section 4. In Blue Shield v.
McCready, the Court discussed its role in interpreting the congressional language
of section 4, and stated that "[c]onsistent with the congressional purpose, we have
refused to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4 remedy." 457 U.S. at 472. In
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957), the Court com-
mented that "[i]n the face of [congressional antitrust] policy this Court should
not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically
set forth by Congress ......
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determining positive law is fundamentally different than the threshold,
jurisdictional issues decided in a standing analysis. Sound antitrust policy
requires a standing analysis that properly accommodates compensatory
objectives and deterrent functions in private antitrust actions, and this
policy should reflect the textual elements set out in section 4 and properly
designed prudential considerations.
3. Prudential Considerations and Their Relationship
to Antitrust Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court's cases on antitrust injury and standing demon-
strate the use of non-textual considerations. 36 These considerations con-
sist of prudential concerns which affect the manner in which the Court
has approached and decided antitrust standing issues. Prudential con-
siderations are important, and necessary, because the broad statutory
language, if applied literally, could permit suits by parties remote to the
antitrust violation or whose damages are tangentially, or inconsequen-
tially, related to any anticompetitive behavior.
137
The considerations shaped by the Court's standing decisions have not
developed in a manner which permits predictable application by lower
courts and antitrust litigants, and there is a great need for clarity and
consistency in the design and application of prudential considerations.
The Court's ruling in Blue Shield v. McCready, for example, holds that
someone not a victim of an antitrust scheme can recover damages if she
has been used as an instrumentality of the scheme.138 This prudential
gloss on the causation element of antitrust standing was ignored in the
Associated General Contractors case. The antitrust injury requirement
articulated in Brunswick, which expressed concern that antitrust plain-
tiffs measure damages in a manner consistent with antitrust policy, was
contorted into a tool to alter substantive antitrust law in the Matsushita
Electric Industrial case. These examples reflect a fundamental problem
with the development of the antitrust standing doctrine: the Court's use
of considerations in ways that contradict the substance of textual standing
requirements. The Court's rejection of congressional policy to provide
jurisdictional recognition to claims for compensation reflects a judicial
usurpation of the congressional policy reflected in section 4.
Prudential considerations which serve to condition access to the federal
136 In Blue Shield v. McCready, the Court admitted that "in the absence of some
articulable consideration of statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in
a particular factual setting, we have applied § 4 in accordance with its plain
language and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives." 457 U.S. at 473.
137 H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 355-66.
138 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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courts are appropriate only if they satisfy three requirements. First, the
consideration must be firmly rooted in the policies which either advance
or are consistent with the fundamental objectives of the antitrust laws. 3 9
Second, prudential consideration must reflect an important concern about
judicial competence to adjudicate the asserted claim. Third, application
of any prudential consideration must be principled and avoid a decision
on the merits of the claim.140
The Court's decisions on antitrust standing demonstrate at least three
prudential considerations which add clarity to the textual requirements
of section 4 and demonstrate an institutional commitment by the courts
to advance antitrust policy. Those considerations are: (1) the plaintiff must
be a proper party to vindicate claims under the antitrust laws; (2) an
antitrust plaintiff cannot measure his damages in an inappropriate man-
ner, and (3) an antitrust plaintiff must show a close and proximate re-
lationship between his injury and conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.
The initial consideration addresses the status of the party as an anti-
trust litigant. Section 4 only requires that the "person" suffer injury to
his "business or property" because of any conduct forbidden in the anti-
trust laws. The antitrust plaintiff should be the sort of participant in the
marketplace in which the violation occurs that ensures that his litigation
will vindicate the policies and objectives of the antitrust laws.'14 A proper
antitrust plaintiff usually will be a competitor of the defendant or a
consumer in the market. 4 2 The legislative history of section 4 clearly
supports recognition of consumers and competitors as proper antitrust
plaintiffs and recognizes their ability to achieve statutory objectives
through the maintenance of private actions. Commonly, these parties
have suffered concrete injuries from anticompetitive conduct and are good
vindicators of the antitrust laws. However, where a plaintiff is not a
consumer or competitor, he may have a sufficient interest in the outcome
" 
9 See Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 472 (recognizing that Court should refuse to
"engraft artificial limitations" on section 4).
140 See Nichol, supra note 11, at 73.
1 The Supreme Court has given this definition a broad reach. In Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948), the
Court recognized that section 4 "does not confine its protection to consumers, or
to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers .... The Act is comprehensive in
its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."
142 See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 772 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985)(victim must be a "participant" in same market as the antitrust defendants);
Henke Enterprises, Inc., v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, 749 F.2d 488, 489-90 (8th Cir.
1984) (plaintiff not a "competitor, participant, nor consumer" in relevant market).
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of the case to ensure the presentation of real issues.143 This may occur
where the plaintiffs claim of injury is sufficiently concrete and there is
no realistic probability of duplicative recoveries against the defendant
for the same offense.14 4
The first prudential consideration, the appropriate status of the plaintiff
as a private attorney general, militates against any requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate public injury from the defendant's conduct. Indeed,
the Court has held that it is not necessary to show an anticompetitive
impact or effect on a relevant market as a condition of maintaining a
lawsuit.145 Rather, it is sufficient that the plaintiff suffer some economic
injury or be a part of a market injured by the anticompetitive conduct of
the defendant. Recognizing standing to sue because of the plaintiffs sta-
tus as a competitor or consumer advances the objectives of section 4 by
presuming that those parties are in sectors of the market in which an-
ticompetitive effects are most likely felt.141
A second prudential consideration requires that an antitrust plaintiff
measure his antitrust damages in an appropriate manner. A central
thrust of the Court's opinion in Brunswick is that a plaintiff may not
measure his damages by the amount of monopoly profits he would have
obtained but for the anticompetitive act. The appropriate damage con-
sideration is a reflection of the jurisprudential principle that a party
should not be permitted to benefit from the wrongdoing of another.147 This
principle has several manifestations. A plaintiff may not measure his
1See, e.g., Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1496-1500,
1499 n.7 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker
Co., 740 F.2d 739, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985);
Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 294-46, 296
n.6 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). See also supra note 141.
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Shield holds that any person who is
injured because of a competitive injury directed at a competitor has suffered
antitrust injury. 457 U.S. at 479, 484. This conclusion appears related to the Blue
Shield Court's reading of the antitrust injury requirement as an aspect of a broad
causation requirement. A clearer linkage between the antitrust injury require-
ment and the causation inquiry would ease the search for perfect antitrust plain-
tiffs and would place more emphasis on the factual nexus between the plaintiffs
claimed damages and the defendant's illegal conduct. However, standing to sue
for such injury may be required by the causation language of section 4; that the
plaintiff be injured "by reason of' some activity which violates the antitrust law.
- Cf H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 365.
145 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 459 U.S. at 482 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S.
at 489 n.19).
146 See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 365 (proposing a standard of pres-
umptive standing to consumer and competitors of the violator).
117 The principle is recognized in tort law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
920 (1977), provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to
the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit
conferred is considered in mitigqtion of damages, to the extent that
this is equitable.
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damages in a way that reflects profits that would have been earned di-
rectly or indirectly from illegal conduct. Further, an antitrust plaintiff
may not recover for speculative, illusory or imaginary damages. 14 Third,
the plaintiffs damages may be established by a "just and reasonable
inference from the proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency
to injure plaintiff's business" and from any evidence of injury which is
"not shown to be attributable to other causes.."149
The second prudential consideration - an appropriate measurement
of damages - advances the deterrence function and the compensatory
objective of section 4 by providing an incentive to a proper antitrust
plaintiff to seek an equitable measure of compensation for injuries suf-
fered and to deter future anticompetitive conduct by trebling that com-
pensation. It also provides a reasonable check on imposition of inequitable
measurements of damages, and protects the policies of the antitrust laws
by preventing overcompensation for injuries unrelated to anticompetitive
behavior.150
A third prudential consideration underlying the antitrust injury doc-
trine examines the nexus between the defendant's conduct which violates
the antitrust laws and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The Court has
emphasized that the relationship between plaintiff's harm and the an-
ticompetitive conduct must be causally and proximately related." 1 The
Court has also held that the plaintiff must prove more than a causal
nexus between the defendant's conduct and his injury; rather, he must
show that the harm he suffered was causally related to the reason that
the defendant's conduct violates the antitrust laws.152 This examination
requires a judicial evaluation of the attributes of the restrictive practice
which are harmful to competition and then compare those attributes to
the plaintiff's assertion of injury.
The third consideration - a demonstrated nexus between the plaintiffs
injury and those aspects of defendant's conduct which makes it anticom-
petitive - forges a connection between the policies of section 4 and sub-
stantive antitrust law. It directs attention to the substantive nature of
the plaintiff's claim and to the types of antitrust violations. Per se vio-
lations, by judicial description, involve conduct which in nature and mag-
nitude are inherently anticompetitive and devoid of redeeming value. 153
Because the per se rule presupposes judicial experience with a particular
14 See, e.g., Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremco, Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir.
1985).
149 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946).
- There is a wide range of proper measurements of damages from antitrust
violations. For a review of those methods, see Treble-Damages Remedy, supra
note 130, at 10-12.
"I See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Car-
penters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
112 See Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477.
13 See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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restraint, the process of identifying the class or classes of anticompetitive
attributes - for example, higher prices, lower output - is simplified.
The threshold nature of antitrust standing analysis, however, only re-
quires that the defendant's conduct violates the antitrust laws, whether
the type of violation is explicit in a statute or is derived by judicial
analysis.
These prudential considerations, when applied in a manner which is
consistent with both the textual statutory requirements and sound an-
titrust policy, demonstrate a principled and value-neutral method of de-
termining the appropriateness of an antitrust plaintiff's claim for
damages. This process for defining antitrust standing as composed on
textual requirements and prudential considerations advances proper in-
stitutional roles because it expresses no view of the merits of the sub-
stantive claim and, more importantly, it advances the congressional policy
underlying section 4.
III. ANTITRUST STANDING IN MAXIMUM RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE CASES
One of the most interesting applications of current doctrine on antitrust
standing and injury occurs in cases involving claims of maximum resale
price maintenance. It is interesting because the standing issues arise in
the context of a per se violation of the Sherman Act and because the
Court has agreed to decide the standing issue. This section addresses, in
the first part, the judicial treatment by two courts of appeal of the an-
titrust standing doctrine in maximum resale price maintenance cases.
These cases sharply focus attention to the policy implications of the rule
of presumptive illegality and its collusion with procedural norms estab-
lished by the antitrust standing and antitrust injury doctrines. In the
final section, a statutory standing analysis is applied to the issue of stand-
ing in maximum resale price maintenance.
A. Analytic Contrasts in Maximum Resale Price
Maintenance Cases
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed the
issue of antitrust standing in cases involving maximum resale price main-
tenance claims.1 5 4 The courts disagreed at a very fundamental level about
11 Compare Indiana Grocery, Inc v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th
Cir. 1989) with USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. granted, -U.S.-, 109 S. Ct. 2446 (1989).
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the meaning of antitrust standing and about the role of the per se rule
in the standing calculus. Before addressing the conflict between those
appellate courts, the following section briefly identifies the substance of
the per se rule and its role in defining the illegality of maximum resale
price maintenance.
1. The Role of Presumptive Liability in Antitrust Analysis
A judicial finding that a restraint of trade is per se illegal amounts to
a conclusion that the business practice is devoid of redeeming commercial,
economic or social value and should be condemned outright and irre-
spective of any putative benefits. 55 Per se, or presumptive, illegality is
a reflection ofjudicial attitudes toward a practice which experience shows
is almost always anticompetitive in either its origin or its effect.156 Per
se rules are the product of either common law condemnation of a practice
or of the Court's experience with a practice. 57 The per se rule must be
contrasted with another method of determining whether a business prac-
tice which restrains trade is illegal, the rule of reason. Under the rule of
reason, a court considers the relevant markets in which the alleged re-
straint has an impact, the nature and history of the alleged restraint,
and any matters in defense or justification offered by the defendant. 15 8
The per se rule and the rule of reason are judicially created forms of
analysis which both guide businessmen and inform the process of anti-
", Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
156 In NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984),
the Court stated:
Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the
likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged conduct. But whether the ul-
timate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market anal-
ysis, the essential inquiry remains the same - whether or not the
challenged restraint enhances competition.
"I See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,354 (1982);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
I' See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85(1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978), the Court explained that:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis.
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect
are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry
is needed to establish their illegality - they are "illegal per se." In
the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only
be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the his-
tory of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either
event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest
of the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute,
that policy decision has been made by the Congress.
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trust litigation under section 1; they do not, however, reflect different
degrees of illegality.'519
One of the most controversial antitrust policies established and main-
tained by the Supreme Court is the treatment of vertical price fixing, or
resale price maintenance, as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 160 In
a series of cases going back to 1911, the Court, despite frequent and
passionate requests for reversal, has held that resale price maintenance
is a restraint of trade actionable under section 1 of the Sherman Act and
is therefore per se illegal.16 '
The Supreme Court has applied the per se rule to claims of vertical
price fixing for several reasons. In an early resale price maintenance case,
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.' 62, the Court held the
practice was illegal because it eliminated the scope of commercial freedom
exercised by businessmen in establishing unilaterally their resale price
and because it operated as a restraint on alienation of goods. The Court
also implied that resale price maintenance was illegal because it reflected
an illicit agreement between retailers or resellers. 6 3 Subsequent cases
have recognized other reasons for concluding that resale price mainte-
nance is facially illegal, including the possibility that resale price main-
tenance may facilitate cartelization at the supplier level and may serve
to implement a predatory strategy aimed at a competing dealer.16 4
The economic explanations for maximum resale price maintenance are
15 See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 124-34. The essential point that the
different methodologies arrive at the same basic conclusion - that the defendant's
conduct is or is not illegal - was cogently presented by the court in Indiana
Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1419:
Thus, an antitrust violation arrived at by a per se rule's presumption
of illegality is not inherently any more evil than a violation deter-
mined by a Rule-of-Reason market analysis. A violation is a violation.
'60 The courts have recognized that resale price maintenance may be manifested
in the form of minimum fixed prices, i.e., a floor price is fixed below which a resale
cannot be made; or of maximum fixed prices, i.e., a ceiling price is fixed above
which a resale cannot be made. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
148 (1968). Some commentators, however, have considered minimum resale price
fixing to be resale price maintenance and maximum resale price maintenance to
be some other form of price fixing. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 629 (4th ed. 1988). This article treats maximum resale price mainte-
nance as a form of resale price maintenance.
161 See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, (1988); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911).
162 220 U.S. 373, 404-45 (1911). The Court invoked the common law proscription
on restraints on alienation of property and questioned the interest which a man-
ufacturer or supplier has in goods after sale. The Court, while acknowledging
that a manufacturer or supplier might have some interests in its product after
sale, held that a manufacturer or supplier has no legitimate interest in controlling
resale prices. Id. at 407-409.
163 Id. at 407-408.
I See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Simp-
son v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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different than the justifications for minimum resale price maintenance.
The principal difference arises from the ability of maximum price fixing
to simultaneously advance the interests of consumers by capping resale
prices while harming retailers or distributors by limiting their resale
margins. Notwithstanding this mixture of pro-competitive and anticom-
petitive effects associated with maximum resale price maintenance, the
Supreme Court, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., held that maximum resale
price maintenance is per se illegal.165 According to the Court, many of
the same reasons which require per se condemnation of minimum resale
price maintenance plans also compel condemnation of maximum price
setting plans. 166 The Court explained that the maximum price may be
too low to permit dealers to provide necessary and desired services, may
rearrange market structures to favor "a few large or specifically advan-
taged dealers", and may tend to approximate and function like a minimum
price set by the manufacturer. 167 The Albrecht Court also rejected the
argument that a supplier, who had granted its distributors exclusive
territorial rights, must be able to cap resale prices to prevent price goug-
ing of customers. The Court held that neither price gouging nor market
power possessed by distributors were issues presented in the case. 68 Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that the argument that price fixing is necessary
to prevent another violation is "unpersuasive." 6 9
There are more current explanations of the effects on competition of
minimum and maximum resale price maintenance. 170 The current liter-
ature suggests that resale price maintenance has both pro-competitive
65 390 U.S. 145,154 (1968).
16, The Court held:
Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences
in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substi-
tuting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the
competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers
to compete and survive in that market. Competition, even in a single
product, is not cast in a single mold.
Id. at 152.
167 Id. at 153.
1 Id. The Court's decision in Albrecht generated a strong dissent from Justice
Harlan. He argued that maximum and minimum resale price maintenance agree-
ments should be characterized individually. According to Harlan, maximum re-
sale price maintenance permits a manufacturer to lower its retail price and expand
volume or output. Id. at 157-58. He also claimed that maximum price ceilings,
unlike minimum price levels, are not invariably harmful because ceilings "do not
lessen horizontal competition; they drive prices toward the level that would be
set by intense competition, and they cannot go below this level unless the man-
ufacturer who dictates them and the customer who accepts them have both mis-
calculated." Id. at 159.
169 Id. at 154.
M7o See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 160, par. 403, 629-41; Overstreet,
Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence 13-28 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n Staff Report 1983); Lafferty, Lande & Kirkwood, Impact Evalua-
tions of Federal Trade Commission Vertical Restraints Cases 5, 29-38 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n Staff Report 1984).
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and anticompetitive manifestations and it is not possible to definitively
assess the competitive impact of the practice.1 7 1 In this respect, the sub-
stantive analysis represented by the per se rule has procedural impli-
cations. The rule advances concerns about judicial efficiency by
eliminating the need for an extensive analysis into the reasonableness
of the practice. The presumptive prohibition of the practice also provides
a bright line rule for the business community. However, per se illegality
may prevent arguably pro-competitive business activity by forbidding an
inquiry into the reasonableness of the practice, and it precludes any
meaningful discussion of the real effects of resale price maintenance.
Aside from the judicial analysis condemning resale price maintenance,
the Congress has indicated its disapproval of the political and economic
effects of resale price maintenance. In repealing the Miller-Tying Act,
the Congress rejected the concept of fair-trade legislation and left it to
the courts to determine an appropriate antitrust response to the prac-
tice. 172 The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply the rule of
reason to vertical price fixing cases, but rather has maintained its position
established in Albrecht that the practice is per se illegal. 7 3
2. The Seventh Circuit's View
The antitrust bar received ajolt in 1984 when the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals issued its decision in Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton
Building, Inc.17 4 The case involved a claim that Morton, a manufacturer
of prefabricated farm buildings, prevented its dealers from selling Mor-
ton's buildings at prices above the price which Morton advertised for the
buildings.1 75 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Richard
Posner, affirmed an order of the district court dismissing a dealer's claim
that Morton's activities constituted resale price maintenance. Posner
noted that Morton imposed an exclusive territorial policy on its dealers
and stated that a maximum resale pricing plan is more important for
171 Overstreet, supra note 170, at 164.
172 Resale price maintenance was statutorily permitted under federal law by
the Miller-Tydings Act. 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1937). The Miller-Tydings
Act was repealed in 1975 by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Public Law
94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
,73 In fact, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982),
the Court emphasized that maximum price fixing was per se illegal irrespective
if it is imposed vertically or as a result of an agreement among competitors. The
Court stressed that maximum price fixing is merely another form of price fixing,
and that the Albrecht and Keifer-Stewart cases "place horizontal agreements to
fix maximum prices on the same legal - even if not economic - footing as
agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices." 457 U.S. at 348.
,7 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984).
171 Id. at 706.
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suppliers using exclusive territories. 176 According to Posner, the issue of
the presumptive illegality of maximum resale price maintenance imposed
by a manufacturer on its dealers was an open question after the GTE
Sylvania case. But Judge Posner recognized a "more fundamental ground"
for affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's resale price fixing case. He
stated that the plaintiff had failed to allege antitrust injury.177 Posner
argued that the antitrust injury rule articulated in Brunswick was merely
another application of a longstanding rule in tort law that a party injured
in a manner not contemplated by statutory protections cannot claim the
benefits of the statute. 178 Posner concluded that even if Morton had fixed
prices, the only harm suffered by Walters arose from competing dealers
lowering their prices to consumers if Walters did not. According to the
court, Walters cannot "complain about having to meet lawful price com-
petition, which antitrust law seeks to encourage, merely because the
competition may have been enabled by an antitrust violation.'
' 79
More recently, the Seventh Circuit, in Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super
Valu Stores, Inc.180, reaffirmed its holding in Jack Walters & Sons. The
court, in a case brought by a competitor to recover lost profits resulting
from a maximum price fixing arrangement, held that an antitrust plain-
tiff cannot prove antitrust injury by alleging a vertical agreement to fix
maximum, nonpredatory prices. 81 The court rejected the plaintiff's ar-
gument that it alleged antitrust injury because the alleged violation was
176 Id. at 706-707. Judge Posner reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) reopened the issue
of the per se illegality of maximum resale price fixing which is used to facilitate
a reasonable exclusive territorial provision. He further speculated that the use
of maximum price limits within exclusive territories is justified because "it forces
price within the territories closer to the competitive level." 737 F.2d at 706-707.
177 The court suggested that the precise activity complained of by the plaintiff
was nothing more than a permissive and necessary adjunct to Morton's adver-
tising policy. The court spoke of the embarrassment to Morton if it advertised a
price and its dealers failed to adhere to the price. Id. at 708. Posner also opined
that "Morton had to pressure its dealers to lower price in order to maintain the
credibility of its price advertising - a form, by the way, of constitutionally pro-
tected speech." Id.
1
7 The Seventh Circuit cited to Gorris v. Scott, 9 L.R. Ex.-125 (1874), for an
apparently controlling "venerable principle of tort causation." 737 F.2d at 708-
709. According to the court, the Gorris case involved the destruction of animals
washed overboard of the defendant's ship. A statute required that animals on
deck be penned for reasons relating to the prevention of contagion. Judge Posner
concluded that the defendant was not liable because the purpose of the statute
was to prevent contagion, not drowning.
17
9 Id. at 709. The court pointed out that maximum resale price maintenance
is only harmful if the maximum prices are set predatorily low. Therefore, any
price above the predatory level, but below the maximum price, is a gain to the
consumer, and competitors like Walters cannot complain.
11o 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 1418. The court stated that the plaintiffs claim that it suffered antitrust
injury was exactly the same claim advanced and rejected in Jack Walters & Sons.
The court also held that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Brunswick,
Matsushita Elec. Indus., and Cargill cases limited the court's ability to find that
the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged antitrust injury. 864 F.2d at 1418.
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per se illegal and its injury, was, therefore necessarily of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 182 The court interpreted Bruns-
wick to support the conclusion that "if a plaintiff complains of damages
that result from a practice that is itself competitive, it is not alleging an
antitrust injury, regardless of whether the practice was enabled by an
antitrust violation, per se or not.'1 3 The plaintiff argued that the court's
failure to recognize antitrust injury in maximum resale price mainte-
nance cases was contradictory to the Supreme Court's decision in Albrecht
v. Herald Co. The Seventh Circuit merely stated that the Albrecht case
was decided nine years before Brunswick and, therefore, the court was
not prevented from applying the antitrust injury doctrine as it saw fit. 84
The Seventh Circuit's view of antitrust standing and antitrust injury
illustrates the confusion created by the current antitrust standing doc-
trine and the need for clarity, along with a return to statutory objectives,
in a revised standard. There are three principle deficiencies in the Seventh
Circuit approach: First, the court assumes that the antitrust standing
analysis must be driven by the substantive goal of enhancing allocative
efficiency; second, its analysis is designed to serve nonjurisdictional ends;
and third, the analysis may result in antitrust violations for which no
one has a private right of action.
The Seventh Circuit cases argue that an antitrust plaintiff claiming
compensable injury because of a price fixing scheme must be injured by
an anticompetitive act and must be injured in a way which produces a
182 Id.
18 Id. The court, relying on Jack Walters & Sons and Matsushita Elec. Indus.,
held that the antitrust injury requirement is the same irrespective of whether
the plaintiff alleges a per se violation or a violation of the rule of reason. The
court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis in USA Petroleum for the reason that
the appropriate focus in determining the existence of antitrust injury is section
4 of the Clayton Act, not the substantive provisions of section I of the Sherman
Act. 864 F.2d at 1419 n.6.
The Indiana Grocery court denigrates the analysis articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in USA Petroleum but fails to describe an appropriate analysis for de-
termining antitrust injury in maximum resale price maintenance cases. Id. In
relying on the reasoning of Jack Walters & Sons, the court in Indiana Grocery
appears to argue that a competitor cannot allege antitrust injury in cases in-
volving nonpredatory maximum price fixing because the practice "is itself com-
petitive." Id. at 1418. This conclusion seems to stand the per se rule "on its head."
Id. at 1419 n.6.
184 Id. at 1420. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that proof of
low, temporarily below-cost pricing by the defendant constituted predatory pric-
ing. The court apparently rejected the argument on its merits, finding that the
pricing involved in the case was merely "vigorous competition." Id. However, the
court also held that only predatory pricing is "anticompetitive and capable of
inflicting antitrust injury" and further, that "nonpredatory pricing is competitive
pricing that cannot inflict antitrust injury upon a competitor." Id.
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greater economic loss than would nonenforcement of the antitrust laws.'
85
For example, in Jack Walters & Sons, the court believed that the private
loss suffered by the terminated distributor was smaller than the social
gain associated with expanded output and product advertising. This ap-
proach to antitrust injury inquires in each case whether or not the plain-
tiff suffered the kind of injury which harms allocative efficiency - that
is, whether it reduces output or raises prices - and it assumes that the
promotion of economic efficiency is the only proper objective for the an-
titrust laws. Even if the court's premise was correct, which itself is the
subject of great debate' 8 , the Seventh Circuit cases fail to address the
importance of section 4's statutory objectives.
The court's analysis makes an ex ante nonjurisdiction decision in max-
imum resale price maintenance cases and therefore disregards both the
proper role of statutory standing and the substantive significance of the
per se rule. For example, the Indiana Grocery court held that injury
stemming from maximum resale price maintenance, a per se violation,
is not actionable where the violation resulted from a practice itself com-
petitive.18 7 The Court's ruling in Jack Walters & Sons, that a terminated
distributor has not suffered antitrust injury by a maximum resale price
maintenance arrangement, means that resale price maintenance is not
illegal insofar as it harms a competitor; a conclusion which is flatly con-
tradicted by the Albrecht decision.'88 The per se rule, which is a statement
of positive antitrust law, obviates the need for a particularized analysis
of the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the objectives of
the antitrust law. The rule presupposes the anticompetitive consequences
of the conduct and spares judicial inquiry into precise economic effects.
The Seventh Circuit decisions strongly suggest lower court dissatisfaction
with the Albrecht decision. 18 9 However, it is incorrect to use the antitrust
standing doctrine to disregard substantive antitrust law.
The Seventh Circuit's failure to accord proper jurisprudential signifi-
cance to the per se rule and its nonjurisdictional standing approach have
another consequence: the congressional objectives of section 4 may, in
some situations, be thwarted. For example, the court's antitrust injury
concept may prevent some classic antitrust plaintiffs, such as competitors
or consumers, from maintaining any action for anticompetitive conduct,
while in other cases it may be possible that no party could maintain an
action for anticompetitive behavior. In this important respect, the Sev-
See id. at 1419-20.
18 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
187 Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1419-20.
m The Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in a case involving min-
imum resale price maintenance. Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986).
189 See Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DuKE L.J. 1014, 1025-
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enth Circuit's approach clearly does not further the objectives of section
4 - deterrence and compensation - because it prevents suits by tradi-
tional "private attorneys general" who have suffered economic injury.
Moreover, the analysis would inject complexity and uncertainty into what
should be a threshold determination of plaintiffs standing to sue.
In the context of maximum resale price maintenance cases, for example,
the Seventh Circuit's standing requirement would be complex and unfair.
If the manufacturer engaged in predatory pricing by establishing a max-
imum resale price which was too low to permit disfavored rivals to exist
at the distribution level, then the disfavored distributors who suffered
losses or were driven out of business could maintain an action. 190 Con-
sumers, however, could not maintain an action for this conduct, even
though the anticompetitive conduct may have affected their ability to
receive desirable products or services. s19 Consumers would not, under this
view, suffer antitrust injury in price fixing cases because they were ben-
efitted by the antitrust violation, even when the nascent combination
subsequently fostered other anticompetitive conduct or the maximum
price became a fixed minimum price.192
If, on the other hand, the maximum price was set not at a predatory
level but rather at a supracompetitive level, then a consumer could main-
tain an action but a competitor could not. The competitor, it could be
argued, was benefitted by the price fixing scheme because it was able to
gouge consumers just like the cartel members. 93 Finally, if the maximum
price was instituted by the manufacturer to protect consumers from price
gouging, say by a distributor in an exclusive territory, then no one -
consumer or competitor - could maintain an action because the defend-
ants' actions, although a per se violation of the Sherman Act, injured no
one. 194
3. The Ninth Circuit's Approach
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.9 5, rejected the analysis and conclusion of the Seventh Cir-
190 See Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1419-20 (competitor cannot claim antitrust
injury for lost profits from defendants' agreement to price at nonpredatory levels).
"I' Cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. at 152-53 ("Maximum prices may be
fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services essential to the value which goods
have for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers
desire and for which they are willing to pay.").
192 See id. at 153.
,93 This is apparently the logic of the Supreme Court's dicta in Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and the Seventh Circuit
in Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1420.
194 See Hovenkamp, supra note 189.
1" 859 F.2d 687, 697 (9th Cir. 1988).
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cuit in Jack Walters & Sons. The USA Petroleum case involved a claim
by independent gasoline retailers who purchased from a defendant, At-
lantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), that ARCO had engaged in maximum resale
price fixing and that the intention behind the price fixing plan was to
force the independent retailers out of the market.19 6 The defendant, in a
summary judgment proceeding, claimed that the alleged injury did not
result in any antitrust injury to plaintiffs and the district court agreed,
dismissing the plaintiffs' lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that plaintiffs had alleged a per se violation of the Sherman Act and that
the plaintiffs had therefore alleged antitrust injury.197
The USA Petroleum court recognized that maximum resale price main-
tenance, like minimum resale price maintenance, is per se illegal. 198
ARCO argued that maximum resale price maintenance increases rather
than decreases competition because it brings prices lower, not higher.199
The court, rejecting ARCO's argument, stated that illegal pricing prac-
tices have the potential for destroying competitors and competition and
that the long term consequences of price fixing conspiracies may be higher
prices and reduced service to consumers.20 0 The court also rejected the
defendant's argument that maximum resale price maintenance is not
actionable unless predatory pricing is shown.2°"
The court held that allegations of price fixing are sufficient to allege
antitrust injury, and reasoned that it must determine whether plaintiffs
injuries resulted from a disruption of competition in the market and were
M Id. at 696. The plaintiffs claimed that ARCO's pricing practices also had
demonstrated effects of forcing certain retailers out of business and heightening
barriers to entry into the retail gasoline market.
197 The court held:
We conclude that the purposes and policies of the antitrust laws are
best effectuated by recognizing the 'standing' of competitors to enforce
the antitrust laws against price-fixing conspiracies. To put the same
point differently, we conclude that the injury done to the market and
to competitors by price-fixing conspiracies is antitrust injury - the
type of injury the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.
Id. at 697.
Il8 Id. at 692-93. The court examined the legislative history of the Sherman
Act, concluding that the drafters clearly intended to condemn price fixing. The
court also concluded that the objectives of the antitrust laws do not favor vertical
price fixing. Id.
- Id. at 695. ARCO asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown Shoe
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) required that the court find that the
antitrust laws were not offended by conduct which stimulated competition. In
Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws were enacted for
the protection of competition, not for the protection of individual competitors.
200 859 F.2d at 696.
201 Id. at 693-94. The court reasoned that predatory pricing is not a necessary
condition to maintenance of a vertical price fixing case because the Supreme
Court has frequently condemned price fixing without any indicia of predatory
behavior.
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caused by the defendant's antitrust violation. 2 2 The court found a direct
connection between USA Petroleum's injuries and the alleged conspiracy
to fix maximum prices because USA Petroleum contended that the in-
tended objective of the price fixing scheme was to disrupt the market for
retail gasoline sales.
20 3
In rejecting ARCO's argument that public injury must be demonstrated,
the court held that harm to competitors is precisely the kind of injury
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.2 4 The Ninth Circuit
also held that since maximum resale price maintenance is another form
of price fixing, the standing inquiry examines the type of injuries which
are prevented by the rule against price fixing was intended to prevent.20 5
Those injuries, according to the court, were generally the same conse-
quences of other price fixing practices.206 The court distinguished Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. as a case involving the plaintiff's failure
to show that the pricing practices were illegal under the substantive
prohibitive antitrust statute.20 7
In USA Petroleum, the court applied an antitrust standing approach
which is fundamentally sound because it stresses the threshold and ju-
risdictional nature of the standing inquiry. It also appears correct because
it tends to advance the congressional objectives of section 4. The court's
decision, however, has analytic limitations.
102 Id. at 693.
203 Id.
2 0 Id. at 697.
20 Id. at 694.
-6 In analogizing the injuries stemming from price fixing generally to the more
specific practice of maximum resale price maintenance, the court stated:
The Supreme Court has indicated that the per se rule against price-
fixing is aimed at the long-term as well as the short-term effects such
practices have in the market, and not merely the immediate conse-
quences for prices. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
108 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-20 (1988) (characterizing interbrand competition
as the primary concern of antitrust law, and listing "the creation and
maintenance of small businesses" as one of its objectives). The removal
of some elements of price competition distorts the markets, and harms
all the participants: those retailers which have lost their ability to
set prices, the other retailers in the same market who are harmed by
the distorted market, and the consumers. Even if we were to analyze
the question at the more specific level of maximum resale price fixing,
given the long-term consequences of that practice we would reach the
same result for similar reasons.
Id. at 694.
207 Id. The court stated that Cargill involved pricing practices which the Su-
preme Court found were vigorously competitive and pointed out that the antitrust
laws protect small businesses only against practices which are forbidden by the
antitrust laws. In this case, according to the court, USA Petroleum's "injuries
result directly from pricing practices that defendants admit (for the purpose of
this appeal) are forbidden by the antitrust laws and are therefore illegal." Id.
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First, the Ninth Circuit's approach presumes injury from the fact that
the plaintiffs were competitors with the defendants and that the defend-
ants allegedly participated in a per se offense. The court's standard pre-
sumes a market injury from the fact that the alleged violation was price
fixing, where closer analysis must be given to the issue of how the plaintiff
suffered injury from defendants' anticompetitive actions.
The court's standing decision also overlooks the language of the Su-
preme Court in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., that competitors can-
not complain about injuries suffered by concerted actions of competitors
where the effect of the conspiracy is to benefit the complaining competitors
through enhancing the market price.20 8 Merely presuming injury from
the allegation of a per se violation does not permit careful judicial atten-
tion to the issues of the relationship between the plaintiffs injury and
the method of compensating him for the defendants' conduct.
Finally, the presumptive illegality analysis of the court in USA Petro-
leum is premised on an equivalence between the effects of horizontal and
vertical price fixing arrangements. Indeed, the court argued that resale
price maintenance was merely another form of price fixing. However, the
conclusion that resale price maintenance may be just another kind of
price fixing fails to address the critical issue of whether the plaintiff
sufficiently and precisely alleged injury of the type which follows from
violations of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. ,209 held that the
"notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per se illegality
and that of vertical per se illegality" has been rejected in prior Supreme
Court caselaw. 210
It appears that neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach to antitrust standing in maximum resale price maintenance cases
properly resolves all threshold standing issues, although the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach is analytically superior to the Seventh Circuit's. In the
next section, the model of statutory standing is applied to the threshold
issues to determine if competitors (and others) should be granted standing
to vindicate those claims under section 1.
B. A Statutory Approach to Maximum Resale Price
Maintenance Cases
A statutory analysis of the antitrust standing doctrine permits reso-
lution of the judicial conflict in maximum resale price maintenance cases.
208 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
209 Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
21oId.
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A maximum resale price maintenance claim asserted by a consumer or
competitor would satisfy the textual requirements of section 4 so long as
the plaintiff can demonstrate that he suffered economic damages as a
result of the vertical price fixing scheme. In other words, the antitrust
plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an economic injury to his
business or property by a maximum price fixing scheme and that the
damages were the type occasioned by resale price maintenance. Pruden-
tial considerations must also be analyzed to determine if antitrust plain-
tiffs are proper parties to vindicate claims under the Sherman Act, have
measured their damages in an appropriate manner, and have alleged a
sufficient connection between their injury and maximum price fixing.
Maximum resale price maintenance, as pointed out in Albrecht v. The
Herald Co., is a practice which may injure customers of the manufacturer
or supplier (say, for example, retailers purchasing from a manufacturer)
and ultimate consumers (e.g., customers of the retailers). The practice
may also harm competitors of retailers that adhere to the price fixing
arrangement. Presumptively, therefore, these parties are proper vindi-
cators of a claim that the defendant's activities constituted vertical price
fixing.
It is apparent, however, that the various parties are likely to be harmed
in different ways by a maximum resale price fixing arrangement; that
is, they may measure their damages in different ways to reflect the types
of injuries they have suffered.211 A retailer may suffer damages because
the maximum price is too low to permit him to provide the kinds of presale
services and activities which his customers desire. His lost trade may be
measured by either a diminution in going concern value of his business
or by lost profits which are measured by the difference between the fixed
price and the price which would prevail in a competitive market.
212
A competitor of parties to the price fixing arrangement may be injured
where he is terminated because of his refusal to comply with the price
fixing arrangement or where he is interfered with because of his refusal
to abide by the cartel price. However, the proper measure of his damages
is not the amount of supracompetitive profits he lost because of the ter-
mination. The terminated distributor may be entitled to the diminution
in value of his business because of the termination, or he may be able to
prove that he lost profits measured by the difference between the price
ceiling and the prevailing price in a competitive market. In cases in-
volving claims by distributors that the price ceiling acted like a price
floor, the plaintiff may recover lost profits measured by the difference
between the price ceiling and the higher level of prices that would have
occurred except for the price fixing arrangement.
211 There are many fundamentally correct methods of measuring damages in
antitrust cases. See Treble-Damages Remedy, supra note 130, at 10-12.
212 See, e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473, 476-77 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Reexamined: Mon-
santo v. Spray-Rite, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 380-82 (J. Kwoka & L. White
eds. 1989).
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The statutory standing analysis also requires consideration of whether
there is a direct relationship between the plaintiff's harm and that aspect
of the defendant's conduct which makes it illegal. The courts have con-
cluded that the probable effects of maximum resale price maintenance
include lower prices, supracompetitive prices, lower output by the dis-
tributor, and greater costs incurred by attempting to sell goods without
a sufficient margin.213 It is these effects which the Court's ban on price
fixing was intended to reach and against which consumers and compet-
itors are entitled to protection. To the extent that the plaintiffs measure
of damages comports with a market effect of maximum resale price main-
tenance, the plaintiff should have standing to maintain his action unless
his claimed damages are not "marginally related to or inconsistent with"
those interests which the Sherman Act seeks to protect.21 4
This analysis of antitrust standing recognizes the instrumental sig-
nificance of the statutory language and purpose of section 4. It also ac-
commodates the concerns that courts should have in applying a private
right of action for damages under the statutory scheme. Most importantly,
it recognizes that antitrust standing is a jurisdictional inquiry into leg-
islative intent, not a means for disposing of substantive antitrust claims
which may temporarily be unpopular.
IV. CONCLUSION
The antitrust standing doctrine, since its articulation by the Supreme
Court in Brunswick, has evolved through a process of judicial interpre-
tation that has left the doctrine without much resemblance to its original
content and jurisprudential significance. Courts have routinely, and re-
flexively, restated the fundamental principles that make up the doctrine,
but they have applied the doctrine as if it constituted an independent
substantive antitrust provision and not a statutorily required jurisdic-
tional guide.
The doctrine, at its core, reflects a fundamental congressional policy to
compensate victims of antitrust violations and to deter future anticom-
petitive behavior. The core values of the antitrust standing doctrine are
enhanced by prudential considerations which represent judicial ap-
proaches to advancing the substantive and procedural policies of the an-
titrust laws. The lower federal courts, in cases involving private causes
of action for maximum resale price maintenance, have lost sight of the
fundamental significance of the antitrust standing doctrine. It is neces-
sary that the Supreme Court formulate a doctrine which accommodates
substantive antitrust policy and advances the jurisdictional policies of
section 4 of the Clayton Act. That doctrine should resemble a traditional
statutory standing analysis that is rooted in congressional policy favoring
private rights of action for antitrust violations.
213 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
214 See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 399.
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